

Between change and continuity

*How has the Norwegian Police Security Service
responded to a new security environment?*

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II

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Glossary and Abbreviations

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 22/7 | Terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 |
| 9/11 | Terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 |
| DSB | Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning / Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap |
| EOS Committee | Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee / Stortingets kontrollutvalg for etterretnings-, overvåkings- og sikkerhetstjenestene |
| FAE | Unit for Common Analysis / Felles Analyseenhhet |
| HRD | Human Resource Development |
| IR | International Relations |
| IT | Information Technology |
| JCTC | Joint Counter-Terrorism Center / Felles kontraterrorsenter |
| KRU | The Committee for Coordination and Advice / Koordinerings- og rådgivningsutvalget for etterretningstjenestene |
| MoD | Ministry of Defense / Forsvarsdepartementet |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Utenriksdepartementet |
| MoJ | Ministry of Justice / Justisdepartementet |
| NDSA | Norwegian Defense Security Agency / Forsvarets Sikkerhetsavdeling |
| NIS | Norwegian Intelligence Service / Etterretningstjenesten |
| NPSS | Norwegian Police Security Service / Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste |
| NSA | National Security Authority / Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet |
| RSU | Norwegian Government's Security Council / Regjeringens sikkerhetsutvalg |
| Stortinget | Norwegian Parliament |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

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Chapter I: Introduction

Over the last decades, and especially in the wake of the dramatic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the role and requirements for western intelligence services has undergone a revolution. The terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid, London, as well as some fifty other planned but averted attacks triggered a massive political response in the western world and clearly demonstrated the need to focus on intelligence (Holme, 2009:172). Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum. It is shaped by the nature of the threats and the environment in which it operates (Campbell, 2013: 45). Accordingly, the intelligence services received increased resources and powers in order to effectively cope with an increasingly complex security environment. In general terms, these developments have been similar across many western countries, Norway including (Whelan, 2012: Hammerlin, 2010:14).

1.1. Questions and objectives

This thesis sets out to identify the requirements for modern intelligence organizations in a new security environment, and the ability of the Norwegian Police Security Service (NPSS) to adapt accordingly. The study raises two interrelated questions with the objective to describe organizational developments and explore possible explanations for change or continuity within the NPSS.

- (1) *How has the NPSS responded to the changes in the security environment?*
- (2) *What key mechanisms can explain change or continuity within the NPSS?*

1.2. Key findings

Through a close examination of relevant primary and secondary sources, the study finds that the NPSS has responded to the new security environment with mixed achievements. The service has over the last decade taken considerable steps to attain broader, multidisciplinary expertise and to become more open and transparent toward the society. Meanwhile, it is indicated that the service is not sufficiently proactive, and that the level of communication with decision-makers and cooperation with other

actors is not at the level suggested by the new security environment. The identified key mechanisms for change and continuity indicate that external correctives, leadership, and changes in the threat scenario, all represent central drivers for development within the NPSS. The identified barriers for change seem largely related to the fact that the NPSS is a restricted organization with accordingly high demands for confidentiality. This implies that the NPSS, in contrast to other public organizations, is not subject to the same correctives and continuous evaluation from the society. This is found to have several adverse consequences for the ability to adapt in accordance with the security environment. Furthermore, as several of the identified key mechanisms are closely related to well-known ideas within organizational theory, it is argued that a future study from this perspective carries potential to produce highly valuable findings with regard to development within the NPSS and intelligence organizations in general.

Having presented some of these principal insights, the remainder of this chapter aims to prepare the research stage by outlining the background, limitations and central concepts of the study.

1.3. Background

At the end of the Cold War in 1989, many initially expected it to revert into a more modest role. For several years, the “peace dividend” served to cut intelligence expenditures in Western states, resulting that many agencies were significantly downsized (Campbell, 2013:46; Sejersted, 2005:122-123). Voices in certain Western parliaments even proposed the abolition of intelligence, or to merge its functions into other institutions of government (Schreier, 2007:25). In Norway, the Police Surveillance Service (former name of the NPSS) was also deliberately downscaled, resulting that the number of personnel in the districts nearly halved (Holme, 2009:171).

Reforms were also introduced in many western countries with aim of making intelligence more accountable. During the days of the Cold War, the political and administrative climate typically saw a broad consensus that vital national interests

were best served by leaving the agencies to themselves (Sejersted, 2005:122-123). This was now changing, and with the disappearance of the one major threat and enemy, the post-Cold War climate invited to a more open and meaningful debate about the intelligence services and their extensive secrecy (Mevik & Huus-Hansen, 2007:144). New light was shed upon previously eclipsed intelligence communities and numerous critical debates fostered a widespread public feeling that the time was ripe for a major examination of the shrouded business of intelligence (Sejersted, 2005:122-123).

Although the 90s was a decade marked by substantial debate concerning the future role of intelligence, in Norway and in Western states in general, it never seemed likely that intelligence would revert to a peripheral role in national decision-making. The new world proved to be more complex than the previous, characterized by diverse and swiftly changing threats - which no longer understandable through the uniform prism of Soviet competition. New approaches to national security were surfacing - broadening the perspectives on threats and blurring their previous boundaries. Governments found themselves in more need of information than perhaps ever before and intelligence budgets gradually started increasing. A major transformation was in progress – a transformation which materialized rapidly with the al-Qaeda led attacks on 9/11 (Herman, 2005:ix, 201; Herman, 2009:341; Omand, 2010:10).

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked the beginning of a period in international politics characterized by increased uncertainty and a higher level of threat (PST, 2002, own translation).

Western intelligence services had not yet fully digested the end of the Cold War when the impact of international terrorism became horrifyingly clear. Already it was obvious that new organizational structures would be necessary to replace those focused on the Soviet bloc, and the attacks on the US added extreme urgency to demands for intelligence reform (Strategic Policy Issue, 2008:33). For several reasons, the attacks of 9/11 represented a watershed for intelligence organizations.

First, although al-Qaeda's capabilities were previously known, the nature of these specific attacks had not been anticipated (Lowenthal, 2009:25). The organization had a vision which pointed back to the golden age of Islam, rather than forward to something modern. Still, their methods of attack, extensive use of the internet, and global system to fund operations, could hardly be described as medieval or old-fashioned. In fact, the threats of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin-Laden to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) made the organization a very modern threat, and one that could not be dealt with by the traditional means of containment and deterrence which developed during the Cold War (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008:83). The attack was planned and financed from different locations than where it happened, and it was executed by people who had received flying lessons in the country which they were attacking. In many ways, the attack represented a new kind of terrorist threat – one which had attuned itself to exploit modern technological developments. The organization of al-Qaeda had a global reach with affiliates in many countries and the network operated across national borders, thus exploiting the vulnerabilities of the globalized society (St.prp. nr. 56, 2001-2002; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:49).

Second, although al-Qaeda's willingness to attack US targets had been amply demonstrated in earlier attacks on western interests, and although there had been extensive investigation into the performance of US intelligence prior to the 2001-attacks, no agencies were in fact able to point up the intelligence that could have led to a precise understanding of al-Qaeda's plans (Lowenthal, 2009:26). Considering that the foremost objective of intelligence is, after all, to keep track of threats that are capable of endangering the nation, 9/11 clearly represents an intelligence failure (Lowenthal, 2009:2). The immediate aftermath of the attacks therefore saw widespread political support and demand for strengthening the capacities for intelligence and surveillance in Western countries, all as part of the new "global war against terrorism". Understandably, these developments were particularly strong in the US, prompting reorganizations and increased authorities for intelligence services (EOS-utvalget, 2002:4; Lowenthal, 2009:25). Still, although at a different scale, similar shifts were evidently seen in Norway. Since the millennium, the NPSS has been assigned with

new tasks, significantly more resources, and wide ranging authorities to monitor potential threats to national security (22. Juli-kommisjonen, 2012:363-365).

One of the most central insights of the 9/11-investigation suggested that the attacks could have been avoided, had the national services and agencies managed to unify their effort and coordinate the information in their joint possession (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). The planning of the 9/11-attacks fell in the void between foreign and domestic threats, which made it harder to make sense of the various fragments of intelligence. As during the Cold War, the foreign agencies had their eyes on external threats, while domestic agencies were watching for threats within the borders. The attack was foreign - but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the US (Gill & Phythian, 2006:120). As a result, the 9/11 Commission-report recommended increased information-sharing between the services and stronger leadership to promote coordination and cooperation. This required, among other things, that structure, procedure and culture within the various agencies had to be adapted; away from the Cold War's clear division of labor, to an approach based on more active cooperation both within and outside the intelligence community (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). It was increasingly suggested that the principle of "need to know", as a means of securing information, should be replaced with the "need to share", in order to maximize the potential to learn about and counter new transnational threats. Furthermore, while the new threats largely preserved the need for covert intelligence and secrecy, society increasingly called for openness and insight into the business of intelligence (Herman, 2005:73; Gill & Phythian, 2006:172, 178). Not only were the agencies accused of being inefficient and overly secretive. Voices more generally argued that intelligence was far too slow, if not incapable, of restructuring and adapting their activities to the new threats and opportunities of the post 9/11-environment (Schreier, 2007:26).

The following passages from the 2001-2002 report for Societal Security clearly demonstrate that the Norwegian Government early recognized some of the broader implications following the Cold War and 9/11;

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the subsequent fight against terrorism represents a watershed. The need for coordination between ministries and between various levels of government was highlighted (St. meld. nr.17, 2001-2002:17, own translation).

Today's threat scenario is very complex without one specific dimensioning threat. The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11 2001 demonstrates how vulnerable the modern society is against such attacks. It cannot be ruled out that Norway may be exposed to terrorism which may affect abruptly and extensively. The Societal Security effort is, unlike during the Cold War, related to a wide variety of security challenges which may arise abruptly and in unexpected ways. These challenges will require a high degree of flexibility and a broader scope of the work for protecting the society (St. meld. nr.17, 2001-2002:29, own translation).

While these extracts seem to suggest a general adaptation of the effort toward national security, we have yet to see whether this awareness is also reflected in fundamental changes within the NPSS – a question to which this thesis devotes its attention.

1.4.Relevance

There are several reasons that a study of change in relation to intelligence organizations is both timely and relevant. The world has still not fully digested the attacks of 9/11, and the Norwegian society remains in shock after the horrible events of July 22 2011 (22/7). Although the wider implications of these events are maybe yet to be seen, certain things appear clear; intelligence has played, and will continue to play a central role.

Over the later years, the NPSS has highlighted the threat of terrorism against Norway as steadily increasing. The proportion of international attacks has increased, and Scandinavia has more often been designated as a target by terrorist organizations. Under this period, militant Islamist groups have commonly been designated the premier threat to the Norwegian society (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:46). However, when the terror struck Norway on 22/7, the perpetrator was no militant Islamist or terrorist organization, but an ethnic Norwegian without proven connections to terrorist-networks in other countries. The following report from the July 22 Commission found no basis to say that the NPSS should have prevented the attacks.

Still, it went far in suggesting that the service, with the appropriate working procedures and a broader focus, might have caught up with Anders Behring Breivik before his fatal acts of violence (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:15, 73).

Although intelligence and security generally has been high on the public agenda after 22/7, research on societal security has not been a priority in Norway over the later years (Aftenposten, 2012). In this sense, 22/7 was a cruel reminder of the vulnerability of our modern society and demonstrated the risk of emerging threats going unnoticed (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3). The realization that new threats could arise amidst us - in the heart of Oslo - revived the many dilemmas and paradoxes of societal security. The security environment is complex, and the tradeoffs in handling it are equally difficult. Commission reports and discussions following 22/7 have accentuated the need to know more on how the intelligence organizations develop in relation to the threats and environment they are facing. For an intelligence service, it is utmost important at any time to be able to adapt to the environment and, not least, the current threat scenario (Holme, 2009:166). These are some of the issues to which this study devotes its attention and effort.

Considering that most documents on the NPSS and the follow-up after 22/7 is written in Norwegian, a review of the service written in English might in itself be valuable and relevant. This is also partly the reason that organization titles, designations and abbreviations are translated to English when found relevant. Furthermore, previous research and literature on intelligence, which is mainly British and American, often focuses on changes in the threat environment, but more rarely on how intelligence organizations have adapted to these changes. In this way, the study illuminates interesting relationships which undeniably deserve more attention and further research. Organizational development in relation to intelligence services, although largely under-studied and under-theorized, should and must be researched. Not at least because of its relevance for intelligence effectiveness in many countries after 9/11, as well as its importance in the post-22/7 reality in Norway. On this note, this study provides a more thorough understanding of the complex landscape in which

intelligence currently operates, and how to navigate this landscape in a best possible way.

1.5.Limitations

The broader perspective of the thesis is defined as *western intelligence organizations*. This distinction, although mainly noticeable in the theoretical section, is found necessary as the thesis is based on literature originating in the western, and primarily, the English-speaking part of the world. Recognizing the absence of any universal standards, the focus is thus relevant in order to define the universe in which the case of the study belongs.

With regard to the NPSS, the study will focus on the organizational aspects at the more strategic level of the service. It is not an objective, nor feasible, to cover tactical units, or the shrouded and more sensitive aspects concerning the methods and capabilities of the service. The thesis is unclassified and its findings are predominantly based upon open source literature.

Moreover, the drivers and barriers identified in the final section of the study are by no means meant to be exhaustive. While recognizing that organizational theory points to countless reasons to why change might occur or not, the intention of this study is not an all-encompassing review of possible explanations for change or continuity within organizations. Rather, the purpose is to modestly suggest and discuss some *plausible* barriers and drivers for change as seen in relation to intelligence organizations, specifically illustrated through a case study of the NPSS. If nothing else, this discussion will provide other researchers with input for a highly interesting topic for further scrutiny and in-depth analysis.

In scope of time, the study is generally limited to the post-Cold War period where the main emphasis of the analysis is devoted to developments after 2001. Although certain historic orientations are needed, the thesis will not dig deep into early antecedents of

intelligence. These restrictions in time are considered beneficial in terms of manageability, as well as with regard to the implications following the Cold War and the 9/11-attacks - causing attention and efforts towards rethinking and reforming the organization of western intelligence services. Also, as the public focus on the NPSS has increased dramatically in the wake of 22/7, much emphasis will naturally be given to the recent processes and reactions which presented from 2011 through October 2013.

1.6.Thesis outline

Chapter II presents the theoretical foundation of the study which draws up a variety of thoughts rooted mainly within intelligence literature and theory. These insights illustrate that intelligence after the end of the Cold War faced a revolution which transformed the requirements for intelligence organization. These requirements for intelligence organizations are presented and operationalized by means of indicators, which accordingly can be applied in the analysis of the study. The rationale behind the framework is to let the theories suggest how modern intelligence should be organized in relation to the changed premises after the Cold War. In this way, the theories indicate what should be observed in an appropriately organized intelligence organization.

Chapter III presents the methods and means of the study, discussing the challenges and opportunities for assuring good quality in the study as a whole.

Chapter IV presents and analyses the developments and relevant material through the eyes of the theoretical expectations. This will allow for an assessment of how the NPSS has adapted in accordance with the changed premises in the security environment. This includes matters such as organizational reforms, changes in strategies, new entities or structures, leadership, as well as resources and personnel. Throughout the analysis the study will consistently pay attention to any potential key mechanisms – drivers and barriers – which might explain organizational change or

continuity within the organization. These will be summarized and discussed following each section.

Chapter V concludes the study by summarizing its main findings, both with regard to the aptness of current organization as well as the identified key mechanisms for explaining change or continuity within intelligence organizations.

As a whole, the study thereby provides insights into the organizational direction of the NPSS, the ability of the organization to adapt in accordance with the security environment, and the potential drivers and barriers for organizational change and development within the organization.

1.7. Concepts

This part presents some conceptual clarifications in relation to the study. The chapter offers its attention first to the concepts of organizational change and intelligence, before narrowing it down to clarify the case of intelligence in Norway.

1.7.1. Organizational change

The term “organization” is one that traditionally is associated with something stable and predictable - reducing variation to foster efficiency. Nevertheless, it is hard imagining an organization preserving the same exact characteristics throughout its whole existence. Changes, at one scale or another, are inevitable. Organizations are growing and shrinking. They are fused or separated, discontinued or redefined. Change is the organizational contradiction which tears down stability for the objective of progress. In an age where society is changing faster than ever before, it is ever important to keep up with this change, and it is increasingly argued that organizations need develop a capacity to change in order to survive (Jacobsen & Thorvik, 2007:350-351).

What is it that defines organizational change? Organizational change is a large, complex field, and the specific definitions vary across different perspectives within organizational theory. For the purpose of this thesis however, one could simply say that organizational change involves restructuring in the form that an organization displays different features on two separate points in time. The nature of the change in itself can take various forms. Practically it is often hard to assert precisely what is being changed, simply because the components of an organization are interrelated and changes in one part are thus likely to produce changes in another. In theory however, organizational change often includes changes in one or several of the following 4 organizational features: (1) change in goals, tasks, and/or strategies; (2) change in structure; (3) change in culture, and/or; (4) change in behavior, such as communication and decision-making (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:351-352, 354).

1.7.2.Intelligence

Even though considerable effort has been devoted to establish a universal concept of intelligence, one has yet to agree on a precise and widely accepted definition of the term. Pioneering scholars in the field tend to differ on what such a definition should include. This section aims to narrow the term down to approach a useful definition for the purpose of this study.

Although intelligence for many people may not seem much different than information, distinguishing the two is important. Indeed, intelligence is always information, but not all information is intelligence. In governments, intelligence is commonly regarded a subset of the broader category of information, representing the entire process by which intelligence is identified, obtained and analyzed in response to the needs of decision-makers (Lowenthal, 2009:1; Herman, 2009:1). Intelligence thus fathoms broader than merely the informational aspects of the concept. This is clearly evident in the early work of American academic Sherman Kent. In 1949, Kent coined a threefold definition of intelligence, which later has come to be one of the most frequently applied definitions of the concept. In line with Kent's understanding, the central

aspects of intelligence can be summarized as: *"the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process (...); and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities"* (Lowenthal, 2009:8). As demonstrated by this definition, intelligence can be understood as a blanket term, covering three closely interrelated phenomena. Firstly, intelligence points to the *activity or process* - often referred to as the intelligence cycle - in which information is required and requested by policy makers, then collected and analyzed by the intelligence organizations, and finally disseminated back to its consumers.




Figure I: The Intelligence Cycle (Lowenthal, 2009:65)

Secondly, intelligence refers to the outcome of this activity, namely the *product and analyses* which are disseminated to inform decision-makers. And thirdly, intelligence refers to the specific *organizations, agencies, and units* that carry out the various operations and functions of intelligence (Lowenthal, 2009:8). The key element for this study is the third and *organizational* conception of intelligence, seen as a set of governmental organizations, often referred to as *intelligence organizations, agencies or services*. However, as all the three conceptions of intelligence are closely interrelated, the study will necessarily touch upon matters related to the *activities* of the organizations and the *products* which they produce (Herman, 2009:2). The term *intelligence organization* in this study refers to a government agency or organization

which carries out intelligence activities for the government. The concept *intelligence community* denotes two or more of these organizations, whose work is often related and sometimes combined, but at the foundation they generally serve different clients and work under various chains of authority and control (Lowenthal, 2009:11).

Although not part of the definition itself, most scholars commonly also acknowledge that intelligence does often, but not always, have an element of *secrecy* where it is collected through covert methods or obtained from sources which must be protected (Baylis, et al., 2010:163). Secrecy, although most pertinent to the activities and products, is a trademark of intelligence, and one which generally distinguishes it from other types of government functions (Lowenthal, 2009:1; Herman, 2005:4-5).

1.7.3. The Norwegian Police Security Service

The NPSS is a civilian agency which operates in the domestic sphere. It is organized as directly subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and reports to the minister but functions as rather independent part of the Norwegian Police Force (Sejersted, 2005:122). The daily collaboration between the NPSS and the ministry is rooted in the Police Department within the MoJ, which carries the main responsibility for the management and control of the NPSS (Traavikutvalget, 2012:17).

The mandate of the NPSS is given by the Police Act, and currently covers; preventing, countering and investigating crimes against the state's security and independence. This includes illegal intelligence activities, illegal transfer of technology, proliferation of WMDs, sabotage and politically motivated violence. These tasks of the NPSS can be summarized into three main categories: intelligence, investigation and security. While the purpose of intelligence activities is to detect any potential threats that can be prevented or avoided, investigation work to determine crimes to be prosecuted. The security-aspect of the tasks is primarily related to safety briefings, advice and life guard service in relation to government officials (Traavikutvalget, 2012:12). Out of these tasks, the main concern of this thesis is the intelligence related activities,

including such as counterintelligence against foreign agencies operating on Norwegian soil, and surveillance of national citizens and groups representing a potential threat to national security or other vital national interests (Sejersted, 2005:122). The NPSS is structured in departments and sections, and the structure reflects a thematic approach to the various tasks of the service.




Figure II: NPSS - Organizational Structure (Traavikutvalget, 2012:14)

The biggest department is the Operative Department, which is responsible for intelligence operations within the NPSS. The department is divided into the following seven sections; Counter-intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Non-proliferation, Counter-extremism and Organized Crime, Technological Support, Undercover Operations, and Open Sources. The Department for Analysis is responsible for processing and analyzing information which mainly collected by the Operative Department from various sources. This information is presented in thematic reports and threat assessments of various kinds. The department comprises three sections; Strategic Analysis, Threat Assessments, and Consultancy. The Department for Security is mainly concerned with the internal security of the NPSS and providing lifeguard services for government officials (Traavikutvalget, 2012:13-15). These departments are those which mainly interest the objectives of this thesis.

In addition to the NPSS, the Norwegian Intelligence Community includes the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Security Authority (NSA). The

organizational structure of the community reflects the traditional distinction common to many democratic states, distinguishing between *external* intelligence and *internal* intelligence/counterintelligence. The NIS is Norway's only foreign intelligence service and it is organized as part of the Armed Forces, reporting to the Chief of Defense and the Minister of Defense. In contrary to the NPSS, the NIS collects information about situations and conditions *outside* Norwegian borders (EOS-utvalget, n.d.). The NSA is a cross-sectorial protective and supervisory directorate, reporting both to the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice. Among others, the NSA is the highest authority for issuing and withdrawing personnel security clearances and for classifying and declassifying information. Although the NSA is secretive, it does not conduct operations such as the NPSS and the NIS (NSM, n.d.; Sejersted, 2005:122).

Chapter II: Theory

The theoretical framework of this study is founded mainly on intelligence theory, with contributions from disciplines including international relations (IR), international security policy and organizational theory. The first section of the chapter will therefore provide an introduction to the theoretical field of intelligence and clarify the theoretical point of departure for the thesis - that intelligence after the end of the Cold War has faced a revolution. The second part presents the substance of this revolution, which has transformed the role and requirements for intelligence organizations. These requirements are operationalized by means of indicators which can facilitate analysis and discussion of the Norwegian case.

2.1. The theoretical field of intelligence

Compared to vast fields such as IR, theories of intelligence are both young and underdeveloped. Intelligence has been an academic discipline for over half a century, and from the beginning until today, scholars have consistently called for a theory of intelligence. Although some authors have entitled sections of their work “theory of intelligence”, only a few books have to date attempted to collect some of the main work in the field. Much is still to be discovered, and the positions within intelligence theory are clearly not as entrenched as they are in political science and other academic fields. For many years, at least until the end of the Cold War, intelligence was often described as the “missing dimension” of historical accounts, but since then, circumstances have changed and the amount of research is now steadily growing. This is partially due to the declassification and release of historical files, but also because of the many questions posed by the September 2001 attacks, followed by others in Madrid, London and elsewhere. These attacks and their responses from Western governments injected urgency into debates about intelligence, thereby forcing it out of the shadows from which it emerged after the Cold War (Gill, et al, 2009:1-2; Gill, 2009:208).

Theories on intelligence are, much like political science, historically dominated by a paradigm predicated largely on the assumptions of IR realism, often referred to as the “national security intelligence paradigm”. As the focus of intelligence is on security and securing relative advantages, the close tie with realism is no surprise, considering that realism is the explanatory approach most centrally concerned with security. The requirement for the former arises out of the latter’s assumptions about the nature of the international system. Outlined by John Mearsheimer, these are;

1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics, and operate in an anarchic international system;
2. All states possess some offensive military capability;
3. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states;
4. The main goal of states is survival;
5. States are rational actors.

In the view of realists, the combination of these assumptions generates an unending security competition, which already provides a theoretical explanation for certain key questions in intelligence, such as why intelligence is necessary, and why intelligence agencies did not disappear with the passing of the Cold War. Such organizations exist in order to reduce this uncertainty about current and future intentions of other states, and to provide warning of any trouble ahead to reduce fear. States operate in an international anarchy where trust is low and wars might occur because there is no higher authority to prevent them. Due to this, states will help themselves as best they can and organize intelligence to act as needed, and as secretly as necessary. As this suggests, realism also provides an explanation for the centrality of secrecy to intelligence. In system based upon the principle of self-help, states can only rely on themselves to provide for their security, and secrecy is therefore an essential ingredient to secure advantage or avoid the development of disadvantageous situations (Phythian, 2009:57-59).

However, the realist viewpoint has some clear limitations. For once, realism was designed to be a parsimonious theory and should not be considered as an explanation

of all international activity. In fact, the theory omits a broad range of relevant actors and factors from its explanatory apparatus. As realism essentially is a theory about *state behavior* and *conflict*, it has little to say about transnational non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, or the increased level of international cooperation witnessed in the post-9/11 environment. Nor can realism give an account for challenges posed by the environment, diseases, or issues such as migration or transnational organized crime (Phythian, 2009:60). Although many of the assumptions underpinning the traditional Westphalian model - which entrenched the principle of territorial sovereignty in inter-state affairs - are still operative in international relations today, the contemporary applicability of the model is dubious.

Therefore, in order to approach a useful outlook for studying the Norwegian intelligence community this thesis departs from the traditional military and state-centered perspectives on intelligence. Drawing on variety of literature, the following section offers some different perspectives which direct attention to the post-Cold War transformation in the role and requirements for intelligence.

2.2.New perspectives and new requirements

As belatedly acknowledged in IR literature, one of the distinctive features of the contemporary transnational system is that the state is no longer the structural key-stone in once was. As James Sheptycki (2009:168) puts it, “*the world system is a polycentric power system where non-state, supra-state, and sub-state actors all play roles in the governance of security that are equal to, and perhaps even more central than, the roles played by state actors*”. The dominant perception of intelligence, shaped by the assumptions of Realism, is increasingly challenged by the post-Cold War developments which alter the nature of the global system, stretching social relations across space and time along a variety of institutional dimensions - technological, organizational, legal and cultural (Sheptycki, 2009:168, 170).

Since the end of the Cold War, the complex debate over globalization - its effects, nature and meaning - has been one of the dominant themes in IR. For what concerns intelligence, globalization has accelerated a wide range of sub-military transnational threats of which terrorism is only one example (Aldrich, 2009:889-890). Peter Gill and Mark Phythian argue that globalization manifests itself along three main dimensions. First, it deepens the level of interaction between local and transnational developments, second, it broadens the range of involved sectors, and third, it makes the world a “smaller place” - so called “spatial stretching” - meaning that developments in one part of the world can have immediate and world-wide impact. According to Gill and Phythian, these three dimensions together mean that the array of potential threats is increasing, and correspondingly, so is the regularity of serious incidents (Gill & Phythian, 2006:41). These transnational domains create new tasks and challenges for intelligence.

The literature of the following section offers some alternative points of insight regarding the new challenges and demands facing intelligence in the post-Cold War era, highlighting new perspectives on state role in providing security, the impact of globalization on intelligence, the human security paradigm, as well as some implications in a Norwegian perspective. From these insights, the thesis identifies 5 specific requirements which are relevant for modern intelligence services:

- (1) Multidisciplinary
- (2) Proactive
- (3) Open and transparent
- (4) Close dialogue with decision-makers
- (5) Cooperative

In the following sections, these requirements are explained before suggesting some specific ways in which these can be measured by presenting some potential indicators for development within the NPSS.

2.2.1.Multidisciplinary

David Omand provides a useful perspective by highlighting how certain key shifts transformed the international security discourse, thereby introducing new demands for the organization of intelligence services. According to Omand, one of the main shifts is the reorientation of the government's responsibility in respect of national security to encompass *a deeper and broader and understanding of security*. The deepening implies that the focus is shifted towards the protection of the individual and daily life of the community, which includes, but goes well beyond defending the territorial integrity of the state. The focus on security from a citizen-perspective naturally leads to a broadening in potential threats to include the full range of disruptive events - from the impact of natural hazards and pandemics, to migration, terrorism, and international crime (Omand, 2010:11).

This shift is also evident in the Human Security Doctrine which surfaced during the late 90s. The concept of human security shifts the discourse away from the emphasis on state-security to focus on security from the view of individual persons and local communities (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). From this perspective, armed conflicts are no longer the sole and dominant concern. Rather, security in this form highlights numerous other issues which pose significant threats to the society; threats from organized crime, illegal migration, diseases, environmental issues, poverty, cyber terrorism and international terrorism, to mention some of them. The underlying realization was that many of these issues had a much more destructive impact on the lives of people than conventional military threats to states (Baylis, et al, 2008:492, 504; Lowenthal, 2009:6).

In 2007, Stein Fredrik Kynø studied the structure and organization of the Norwegian Intelligence Community. Among others, Kynø found that the post-Cold War reality necessitate changes in intelligence in order to safeguard Norwegian interests against complex threats such as transnational crime and non-state terrorist organizations, as well as supporting a foreign and security policy that includes an increasing number of ministries (Kynø, 2010: 167). During the Cold War, Norwegian intelligence focused

on the capacities, activities and intentions of the Soviet Union. Today, evolvments in the security environment suggests that the focus needs to be more on transnational non-state actors and other new threats which may pose a danger, not only to the territorial integrity of the state, but also to the nation's human and societal security and its system of values (Kynø, 2010: 156-157).

Vegard Valther Hansen emphasize that the new threats and globalization in the post-Cold War period most notably has increased the requirements for analytical capacities within intelligence (Hansen, referred in Wilhelmsen, 2011:49). The increased complexity in the threat environment means that intelligence agencies need to recruit broader expertise in order to "connect the dots". The competency requirements for intelligence are therefore not dissimilar to that of the ministries, including political scientists, historians and economists, to mention some (Wilhelmsen, 2011:51-52).

Together, these developments require that intelligence organizations are multidisciplinary in their staffing, outlook and analysis in order to produce intelligence on a range of issues within a broader understanding of security. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are:

➤ ***Internal or external sources indicate broad recruitment***

Statements from internal sources or knowledgeable external sources which demonstrate a broader approach to recruitment or otherwise indicate the recruitment strategy or staffing of the service.

➤ ***Figures demonstrate increased level of broad expertise***

Figures showing an increased proportion of employees with background from various disciplines outside the police.

➤ ***Competency requirements and job advertisements***

The announced needs for expertise and public job advertisements demonstrate that the service hires analytics with varied academic background.

2.2.2.Proactive

Paradoxically, while the general fear in western societies increased relentlessly after 9/11, none of the so-called “new threats” were of comparable scale to the Cold War-threat of mutual annihilation. However, in the globalized world, threats appeared more diverse, fluid, and complex than ever before (Gill & Phythian, 2006:172). Wilhelmsen found that these developments require intelligence to take a more preventive and proactive role, in opposite to its previously more reactive stance (Wilhelmsen, 2011:35). Intelligence needs to be as much in advance as possible in order to predict and unveil future threats, and to understand their underlying causes and suggest preventative measures. Omand refers to this shift as an increased emphasis on *the value of anticipation*. From the more reactive stance of the Cold War, Omand suggests that looking ahead to recognize the future has become increasingly important in order to justify attention before the danger becomes present, preferably reducing the impact of threats, and ideally acting in advance as to avert the problems altogether. In other words, proactivity is required to avert the possible adverse consequences of inaction before they materialize. The increased focus on anticipation naturally raises the importance of having effective intelligence services to provide input to the pre-emptive effort. Furthermore, anticipation is not only defined by capabilities to detect terrorist networks and frustrate impending plots, but also to understand the underlying ideology of the terrorists and explain their motivations in order to prevent future radicalization and implement risk-mitigating policies. To be useful, such work needs to be fundamentally multidisciplinary, and to some extent, break out of the wall of secrecy surrounding most intelligence activities. Omand emphasize that an approach like this would require contributions from most of the capabilities of civil government (Omand, 2010:11-12).

According to James Sheptycki the human security perspective also takes a more proactive formula than the traditional security perspective. Whether it is sudden threats such as earthquakes or enduring threats such as poverty, human security promotes the development of early warning mechanisms to help to mitigate the impact of current threats and, where possible, prevent the occurrence of future threats. The approach

aims to be proactive about the fundamental causes of insecurity, not simply an event-driven reaction to manifestations of insecurity (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). In this perspective, intelligence should not only have capabilities to present relevant forecasts and timely projections about future concerns, but also be able to change its focus and alter direction when the circumstances require such (Kynø, 2010: 158).

According to these insights, intelligence organizations need to be proactive and strategic in order to predict and unveil future threats and to understand their underlying causes in order to suggest preventative measures, including the ability to change focus and alter direction. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are:

➤ *Statements of strategic perspective and attention to new threats*

Statements indicate that the service has a strategic perspective and pay notion to potential new and emerging threats which are not commonly established as current threats.

➤ *Stated focus on root-causes*

Statements indicate that the service focuses on the root-causes of threats and work proactively in order to avert potential threats from becoming real.

➤ *Evidence of prevented threats*

Evidence or statements indicate that threats have been detected and impeded before becoming a real threat to the society.

➤ *Legal provisions or organizational amendments*

New legal provisions or organizational changes have been introduced with the aim to facilitate a proactive effort of intelligence.

2.2.3.Open and transparent

Today, secret services are constantly monitored, examined and called to account.

Agencies that previously operated in the shadows now work under the spotlight of a globalized media, which is not much constrained by rules of state secrecy. According to Richard J. Aldrich, this is another effect of globalization - the growth of vast

networks of global civil society and human rights campaigners, which have introduced higher expectations for ethical policy, regulation, transparency and accountability. One result of this is evident in the regulatory revolution during the 90s where the European Convention on Human Rights was written into the core guidance of European intelligence and security services. Accountability no longer flows exclusively from parliamentary oversight committees, but increasingly from a network of activists and journalists (Aldrich, 2009:892). In a democratic state, intelligence services need not only be efficient in dealing with threats, they also need to function in a legitimate and democratic manner. In this relation, Baylis notes that one of the big challenges for democracies today is to figure out how to battle irregular threats while still remaining true to its democratic values (Baylis, et al., 2010:155). After all, one of the basic principles of democracy is to secure and maintain the public consent for the activities of the state, and intelligence agencies should accordingly, like other areas of state activity, be perceived as performing a necessary function, demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of their operation, and be held accountable for their actions and those of their members (Caparini, 2007:3).

According to Sheptycki, the need for intelligence openness is also reflected in the human security doctrine, which holds that its own legitimacy is secured through transparency and public engagement with the political processes of the society in which it operates (Sheptycki, 2009:171-172). Political and public confidence is a precondition for the intelligence services to perform effectively, especially when considering the means at their hands. As during the Cold War, the methods and sources of the services still needs to remain protected from public disclosure, but the intelligence organizations needs to offer the public more insight into its contribution for safeguarding vital national interests and supporting the established political interests. Exaggerated concealment might lead to unnecessary suspicions and accusations, breed mistrust among the public, and in the long term, weaken the services ability to effectively perform their mandated tasks and operations (Kynø, 2010: 158-159). By raising the public awareness of their effort, work and contribution toward a safer society, the services could devote less resource to defend their

activities, in turn providing more room for focusing on tasks within their primary responsibility (Kynø, 2010: 156-157).

On this background, the intelligence organizations need to be as open and transparent as possible, in order to maintain community confidence in their efforts. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are:

➤ ***Stated awareness and clear strategy for openness***

Stated awareness from the service, acknowledging the need to be open towards the society, and clearly defining which matters the service can and cannot be open about.

➤ ***Active communication***

The service is actively engaging in communication toward the society through websites or other platforms.

➤ ***Information is easy accessible***

Information around the work and effort of the organization is easily accessible for the public eye.

➤ ***Public appearances***

Representatives from the agencies make public appearances through the media, speeches, interviews, articles, etc.

➤ ***Declassification of information***

The agencies declassify or release information or documents for the public domain, allowing externals such as researchers or the media review their organization, work, and general effort toward securing the society.

2.2.4. Close dialogue with decision-makers

Trond Arntsen highlights that one of the prominent challenges of intelligence is that political decision-makers often do not understand its nature and application, while the intelligence services – due to lack of knowledge and long distance to their users – do not manage to get through with relevant, timely and precise information (Arntsen,

2010: 131). To ensure relevant support, right priorities and an effective feedback loop, it is decisive that the services and political decision-makers maintain a short and clear chain of communication. During the height of the Cold War the main input required by the government was a threat assessment of High, Medium, or Low. Today's complex issues and threats clearly necessitate new standards for communication between intelligence services and decision-makers (Kynø, 2010: 157-158).

The requirement for intelligence organizations to provide analyzes in a number of Norway's areas of interest has intensified significantly since the end of the Cold War. According to Kynø, the increased demand for intelligence from a number of ministries have magnified the requirement for the service's to provide support for decisions across a variety of departments and sectors related to Norwegian interest. This means that the services need to be accessible to more governmental actors outside its parent ministry (Kynø, 2010: 155-156). This is also reflected by Kjetil Wilhelmsen who found that the new paradigm and its increased complexity generated more and new customers to intelligence. The dialogue with the customers is by intelligence services designated to be one of the most important instruments for achieving good products, and with the expanded portfolio and increased number of users, this dialogue has become more demanding under the post-Cold War paradigm. This necessitates more interaction and closer communication between intelligence and its principals (Wilhelmsen, 2011:33-34).

To ensure relevant support, right priorities and an effective feedback loop, it is decisive that the services and political decision-makers maintain a short and clear chain of command. Today's complex environment necessitates new standards for communication between intelligence services and a variety of political decision-makers. Potential indicators to evaluate development within the NPSS are:

➤ ***Clear chains of communication***

Evidence that clear instructions and clear chains of communication are established for the relationship between the service and the relevant ministries/governmental actors.

➤ ***Provides support to high-level decision-makers and the wider government***

Intelligence resources are allocated specifically for relevant political actors, such as in direct support to high-level decision-makers.

➤ ***Government officials recognize the value of intelligence***

Evidence that government officials recognize and utilize the potential of intelligence to support decision making.

2.2.5.Cooperative

The broadened scope of potential threats and their transnational nature has blurred the traditional distinction between strictly foreign and domestic domains, thereby necessitating more cooperation within the intelligence community (Kynø, 2010: 156-157). Aldrich highlight that globalization has delivered new opportunities for criminal activity and violence on a considerable scale, and while international crime in itself is nothing new, the criminal structures witnessed today are more adaptive and undifferentiated. They are highly decentralized, horizontal, and fluid; they specialize in cross-border movement and are also very proficient in their use of modern technologies. They are, as Aldrich puts it, “the miscreants of globalization”. Aldrich portrays a seemingly borderless world in which states bounce clumsily around while their many illicit opponents dance elegantly. He argues that the shift towards transnational threats has presented intelligence services with major challenges, precisely because today’s threats operate in the seams of national jurisdictions. Intelligence services, which traditionally cooperated hesitantly, are now forced to share widely with a wide array of domestic and foreign partners, in an effort to keep up with elusive opponents (Aldrich, 2009:890-891).

As during the Cold War, the need to clearly define and distinguish the roles of internal and external intelligence services is still applicable. However, in an increasingly complex environment with threats operating regardless of state borders, cooperation and joint assessments within and outside the intelligence community has become essential. Structures, instructions and legislations therefore need to be adapted to these new realities. The organizations need to facilitate coordination and cooperation which can ensure the effective use of all intelligence resources in the government's possession (Kynø, 2010: 159-160).

In conclusion, intelligence organizations need to be properly organized for cooperation and coordination with other intelligence organizations, as well as with other relevant actors of government. Potential indicators to evaluate development are:

➤ ***Legal provisions and instructions for cooperation***

Legal provisions and instructions facilitate for cooperation between the services, and clearly delineate what form such cooperation should take and what the cooperation should entail.

➤ ***Joint units***

New entities established for the purpose of coordination and cooperation.

➤ ***Joint products***

Joint-products such as analyses or assessments have been prepared involving personnel from the various services.

➤ ***Arrangements for cooperation with other relevant actors***

Arrangements and instructions are established to facilitate and ensure the cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence community.

Through relevant insights and perspectives, this chapter has demonstrated how the new security environment transformed the role and requirements for modern intelligence organization. Before these are applied to analyze the case of the study, the following chapter will describe the methods and procedures of the research.

Chapter III: Methodology

The principal design of this research can be described as an exploratory case study, aiming to gain a deeper understanding of the subject and identify some potential mechanisms or hypotheses which might be applicable to other cases and subsequent studies. This chapter sets out to demonstrate the methods of the research, herein discussing some of its strengths and limitations when it comes to assuring quality in the study. This implies that some attention will be given to issues concerning the classical criteria of validity and reliability.

3.1.Exploratory design

The purpose of the study is to describe developments within the NPSS in relation to the security environment and discuss potential key mechanisms, which can explain either change or continuity within the organization. The research is inductive in its approach, which by Ottar Hellevik is highlighted to be especially useful when the field under analysis is little conceptualized or unexplored, meaning that there are few established models for the research to be based upon (Hellevik, 2002:83). Rather than testing a set of pre-determined hypotheses, the focus of the study is to discover interesting relationships and mechanisms related to organizational change in intelligence organizations. The study collects a great amount of data, which is then analyzed through a framework of requirements for modern intelligence organizations. By carefully studying the organization's response in relation to the framework the research is able to identify and discuss a variety of potential catalysts and barriers for change in relation to intelligence organizations.

According to McNabb, most exploratory research is conducted for one of two purposes: (1) preparatory examination of an issue in order to gain insight and ideas, or (2) information-gathering for immediate application to an administrative problem. In neither of these cases is exploratory research intended to serve as an in-depth scrutiny of all the factors related to a political phenomenon. The research can provide input to administrative decision-making by highlighting organizational issues or possible

answers to organizational questions - an approach which is frequently used in public administration. However, the majority of exploratory research is conducted to investigate an issue or topic in order to develop insight and ideas about its underlying nature. In these cases, there is usually limited prior knowledge about the topic at hand or even few preconceptions about how to study the issue. As a result, exploratory research is often flexible and usually involves qualitative methods such as examination of documentary evidence (McNabb, 2010:96-97).

3.2. Case study

The research is a case study of the NPSS, supplemented with a limited number of examples from other countries for illustrative and comparative purposes. In David McNabb's book, *Research Methods for Political Science*, a case study is referred to as the study of *one of something* – essentially including any single event, person, organizational unit, or whatever else applicable to the world of politics (McNabb, 2010:104). In this research, the examination of the NPSS can be regarded a study of one intelligence organization within the universe of western intelligence organizations.

Some advantageous points of the case study method should be highlighted. For one, case studies often tend to bring out information that might be ignored or not even brought to mind in other study methods. Case studies push researchers to work in depth, and to go beyond the surface indications in order to dig out the reasons and meanings - not merely descriptions - for why things happen as they do. Political phenomena like intelligence organizations are not simple and single-faceted; usually they will be as complex as the people who function within them. In this relation, the case study can serve to remind researchers of the complexity of the political world by facilitating a detailed examination down to the level of individual persons (McNabb, 2010:105). This is found especially beneficial in order to achieve the necessary level of detail and depth to explore the relatively understudied topic of this study.

3.3.Sources and data

In similar to most research on intelligence organizations, this study will at one stage or another meet some empirical challenges related to the sensitivity of the organizations and its implicit challenges for accessing the required data for research. Many people with insight into the organization might be either reluctant or prohibited to express themselves publicly on the topic. Nonetheless, I do believe that the questions of the study, with an exclusive focus on organizational matters, are in fact amenable to research without access to graded information. This is especially due to developments following 22/7, which has caused significant public attention toward some of the central questions of this study. The objective was to write an unclassified thesis and the predominant share of sources are those which already available in the open forum.

The findings of the study are based upon qualitative analysis of relevant primary and secondary sources. Specifically, primary sources include official governmental records, reports and transcripts from open hearings, transcripts from interviews, as well as reports released by the service itself, such as internal assessments, web-posts, and public threat assessments. The relevant secondary sources are mainly commission reports, the media, previous research, external examinations, and other relevant publications and literature on the topic. For the process of gathering information, the limited public material available paired with the exploratory nature of the study implied that a broad and inclusive approach to data collection was required. After identifying many potential sources and documents, the first step of the analysis implied reading the documents and labeling those sections and themes which might be of interest according to the predefined indicators of the study (see chapter II). In the following step, these sections were written into another document to achieve better structure and more detailed labels of the material. These two steps, although time-consuming, were found highly useful when writing the analysis. After an initial draft of the analysis had been written, an additional broad data collection was conducted in order to fill gaps or identify supplementary evidence to the data-material. This also included revisiting the original raw-material that had been identified in the initially, in

order to potentially discover overlooked information. This supplementary evidence was then instantly incorporated in the analysis.

The broad and inclusive approach to the data-collection means that a cautious and critical way of approaching the evidence was central in the process of analysis. The researcher had to attain a comprehensive understanding of the origin, context, legitimacy and quality of the various materials, especially with regard to secondary sources. This was important since the findings of the analysis might be contingent on what specific sources of information that were used. In this relation, internal and external government sources might represent two distinct viewpoints, which may differ equally with respect to pointing criticism or compliments at the intelligence organizations and their efforts. More specifically, internal reports and sources originated within the organization were expected to reflect a less critical perspective on the organization than what was expected of external sources such as commission-reports and news articles. Questions related to organizational culture or matters of internal leadership might be easy to critically comment for sources outside the organization, but not equally easy for a source which is part of the system itself. With regard to secondary sources such as external commission reports, the study also visited the original interviews which underpin some of the conclusions of the commissions. In this way, the research might not only assure the quality of these secondary sources, but also potentially observe statements which were not found relevant within the mandate of the commission, but which are relevant for the objectives of this study.

One should also note that general policy-documents developed within the organization or within the government often might indicate an intent to change or develop the organization. However, these intentions cannot, without evidence of action within the organization, be assumed to constitute actual developments. Rather, what these documents can illustrate is that the organization and the government acknowledge and are attentive to the need for development. In the analysis, such accounts are therefore not referred to as development, but *awareness*.

These issues present some of the challenges with the material, which will require continuous and careful attention throughout the analysis.

3.4.Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are central criteria for evaluating the quality of a research.

Two types of validity are relevant for this study; external validity and internal validity. External validity pertains to the potential for drawing generalizations from the findings of the study. Such generalizations are often highlighted as one major challenge of case studies. Some would even claim that the goals of specificity and generality are mutually exclusive (Gerring, 2007:20). Nevertheless, as many intelligence organizations generally share the same fundamental characteristics, the findings of this study might prove applicable to other similar cases, especially with regard to explaining change or continuity within western intelligence organizations. Moreover, it is likely that several identified drivers and barriers for change might remain relatively stable in time, thus allowing for potential generalization to other future time periods with reference to the same specific case.

Internal validity on the other hand, refers to the internal accuracy of the analysis as a whole. In other words; does the study analyze what it was intended to analyze and is the data relevant for answering the questions of the study (Hellevik, 2002:102, 183, 357). In chapter II, the study identified 5 requirements and suggested some indicators to assess developments within the NPSS. Seen in relation to the data material, these indicators have certain challenges which deserve some attention here. One requirement for modern intelligence services is that they need to be sufficiently open and transparent in order to maintain community confidence in their effort. However, this requirement might pose some concerns to the validity when examining all the other requirements. In this case, the research might be disposed to wrongly assume that the service has become more proactive, multidisciplinary, has closer dialogue with decision-makers and are more cooperative, simply because the data on these indicators

has increased as a function of the services being more open and transparent toward the society. The research should therefore guard itself from inferring that *more information* is synonymous with *development*, which could yield a biased representation of the developments. When early data-material on the indicators is underrepresented, the research needs to find sources which can demonstrate actual progress and development during the period under study, for instance through statements from knowledgeable sources.

Reliability in qualitative studies refers to the accuracy and use of the data gathered. More specifically, this relates to the trustworthiness of the sources in the study, and how conscientiously the collection of data has been undertaken (Hellevik, 2002:53, 363). Furthermore, reliability also concerns the extent that the study facilitates and allows for successive testing and replication of its results and findings (Manheim, et al, 2008). If several independent replications of the study would obtain the same conclusions by using the same exact methods, reliability of the research would be high. In order to allow other researchers to evaluate and possibly repeat the study, the researcher will consistently and honestly seek to clarify the sources, their origins, and their availability in the open forum (Manheim, et al, 2008). However, the data-material in itself might still present concerns to reliability, and being aware of these challenges is important in order to ensure the right representation of the organization and its ability to change. In this relation, it is expected that sources within the organization might publicly want to portray an overly positive image of the organization, simply because this reflects upon that person as a leader or upon the public confidence in the organization. By triangulating sources of different origin, such as the media, external sources and internal sources, the study can use various references in order to achieve a more balanced representation, which again will serve to strengthen the reliability of the analysis.

Reliability concerns are also evident in the use of secondary sources such as newspapers, where the identities of the informants are often not disclosed. Usually, the newspaper, in similar to intelligence itself, has to protect its sources in order to obtain

information on the more sensitive matters or criticism toward the organization. Thus, the reliability of these sources is largely left to the ethics and quality of the Norwegian press. Even though the researcher will not be able to achieve the full confidence in a newspaper's true reproduction of informants opinions, the sources can to some extent be tested by cross-checking the opinions with different sources. Furthermore, the findings of central secondary sources, such as the commission reports following 22/7, can also be assured by visiting the original interviews of the commission which later has been declassified for the public eye. To further strengthen the reliability and avoid potential misrepresentations and misunderstandings, important sections of the data-material are also presented by quoting the original sources.

With these methodological considerations and challenges in mind, the following chapter sets out to analyze developments within the NPSS in relation to the identified requirements for modern intelligence organizations.

Chapter IV: Developments - drivers and barriers

Western governments have responded to the threat of terrorism in several different ways. Many countries have implemented measures to improve national and international security cooperation; some have developed new entities while others have adapted legislation and administrative procedures (Whelan, 2012:2). Similarly, the NPSS has undertaken steps and organizational adjustments in response to the changed premises after the Cold War, and most noticeably, after 9/11.

The insights of Chapter II have demonstrated how the end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 gave new direction to Western and Norwegian ways of thinking about security. In this chapter, the study turns to the identified requirements for modern intelligence organizations in order to assess developments within the NPSS. The indicators for development that were presented in chapter II will provide some guidelines for this effort by suggesting which material and evidence that potentially can demonstrate development. Furthermore, the analysis will continuously seek to identify potential key mechanisms - drivers and barriers – which might explain change or continuity within the organization.

4.1.Multidisciplinary

Intelligence organizations need to be multidisciplinary in their staffing, outlook and analysis in order to produce intelligence on a range of issues within a broader understanding of security.

Indicators:

- *Internal or external sources indicate broad recruitment*
- *Figures demonstrate increased level of broad expertise*
- *Competency requirements and job advertisements*

Early efforts at recruitment

In 1994, the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) appointed the Lund Commission to examine the activities of the Police Surveillance Service from 1945. The findings of the Commission documented extensive surveillance of Norwegian citizens throughout the whole post-war period, and the report testified that “special relations” were

established between the service and leaders of the ruling Labour Party (Vitkauskas, 1999:48). The following judgment from the Director of Public Prosecutions represented a rough encounter with reality for the intelligence service and signaled that a massive cleanup was in the offing (Holme, 2009:170). The Norwegian Parliament established the EOS Committee to prevent future scandals. Regulations were tightened, and the Danielsen Committee was established to undertake a thorough examination of the service (Sejersted, 2005:123; Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:42). In 1998, the Danielsen Committee presented a series of recommendations which formed basis for substantial reorganizations culminating that the service in 2002 took its new name, the Police Security Service (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). Among others, the Danielsen Committee emphasized that the service needed to be supplemented with external expertise through future appointments in order to strengthen its ability to adapt and plan towards the unknown. Acknowledging that stability in staffing could be justified on a professional basis, the committee noted that stability also could lead to unproductive cemented attitudes and cultures - especially considering that the service earlier had received criticisms for its closed culture. Many officials had worked in the service over a long period of time, and the committee therefore saw it highly necessary to introduce a regular element of new impulse in the service. This was especially highlighted in relation to the work on analyses and threat assessments (PST, 2002; Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998).

These recommendations from the committee demonstrate that the NPSS early received indications of the need to recruit more broadly. Per Sefland, who led the service in the period 1997-2003, planned and conducted the first changes. 17 middle managers were dismissed and the service hired social scientists, analysts and lawyers (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:42). To a greater extent it was now emphasized recruitment of staff with backgrounds outside the police in order to provide the service with more perspectives and analytical capabilities (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). According to Jørn Holme, Sefland's successor, these changes did not go undisputed in the organization and the replacement of several leaders was met with internal resistance (Holme, 2009:171-172). The NPSS headquarter in Oslo underwent a major reorganization, changing

name to *the Central Unit* and reducing the number of departments, creating one single operative division which included the former counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism units, and furthermore, considerably strengthening the analytical functions within the service (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). During an open hearing in the Storting in November 2012, Jørn Holme gave his predecessor Sefland a considerable amount of honor for initiating what he calls “a cleanup” in the cultures which dominated during the Cold War. Holme argues that much was done for adapting the service toward a new and broader threat scenario, highlighting that;

The main focus was multidisciplinary expertise and to recruit people other than policemen which often had only one year of education - like the old organization mainly comprised (Stortinget, 2012, own translation).

The efforts under the leadership of Sefland and Holme provide the study with internal evidence that the service early in the 2000s took on a far broader approach to recruitment.

Noticeable improvement in expertise

In 2011, the Norwegian Government appointed the Traavik Commission to evaluate the organization and work of the NPSS. The commission found that the changes over the last decade had moved the NPSS significantly in direction of becoming a multidisciplinary service with a considerable element of academic expertise (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11). This is also reflected in the July 22 Commission’s interview with Special Advisor at the MoJ, Morten Ruud. Ruud emphasize that the NPSS has undergone a massive upgrading, both in terms of expertise and staffing in general.

From being purely a police organization, the service has, over the last decade, become a multidisciplinary organization with analytical capabilities far beyond what it had previously (Ruud, 2012:9, own translation).

According to the Traavik Commission, many work processes have been professionalized, and the focus on analysis characterize the service to a much greater extent than what was the case 10 years ago. It is also recognized that the organization

has worked actively to improve recruitment processes over recent years, which has contributed to raise the level of expertise and moved the organization in the direction of becoming a modern “knowledge organization” (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11, 47). This applies especially to certain areas of the organization such as investigative activities, undercover operations and the lifeguard service, where targeted and systematic efforts have been made to increase the competence. Common to these areas is their externally oriented role, meaning that their work is regularly under review by other actors, which accordingly can bring important correctives to the service. The result is that these parts of the organization have developed a culture of continuous effort toward improvement, among others by taking advantage of the opportunities that lie in vacant or new positions, by hiring employees with complementary expertise (Traavikutvalget, 2012:23). According to the developed indicators, these insights from knowledgeable external sources provide evidence that the organization has raised its level of expertise significantly over the last decade, among other through improved recruitment processes and an increased focus on analysis.

This is also confirmed by the figures and numbers of staffing within the organization. At the end of 2011, a total of 45 positions at the Central Unit were associated with various analytical functions such as strategic analysis and threat assessment. According to the Traavik Commission, most of these analytical tasks have been established over the last decade, and the scope of the work has steadily increased during this period. The number of analysts at the Central Unit has more than tripled since 2002, and the commission notes that the analytical capacities have become highly important for the work of the organization (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32). From 2002 to 2011, the total NPSS staffing increased by 55%. In 2009, the staff included around 60 people with various educations at master’s level, and by 2011, 30% of the personnel had background from outside the police. The total number of educated specialists by then amounted to 15%, compared with 8% in 2002 (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5, 11; Holme, 2009:174).

In relation to sources that demonstrate the competency requirements and job advertisements of the NPSS, the public webpage of the service currently states that the service has a multidisciplinary working environment which strives for openness and interdisciplinary collaboration. Further, the webpage clearly reflects a broad approach to recruitment;

Our responsibilities require that employees have different and varied expertise. Our required competence changes with the society. Our staffs come from very different educational backgrounds. The NPSS has everything from police officers to employees with training in social sciences, law, finance, information technology, engineering, language, history, psychology and religion. Our employee's also have very diverse professional experience (PST, n.d. a, own translation).

For the service to be effective, it is furthermore emphasized that an increasingly diverse society needs to be met by an equal diversity in the attitudes, values, and perspectives of employees within the service (PST, n.d. a). Over the later years, the NPSS have been present at several career fairs, such as those held at the University of Oslo. These are arenas where job seekers and newly educated can meet with potential future employers to learn out about their career opportunities. Again, this clearly reflects an awareness and active effort toward attaining the required level of multidisciplinary expertise.

A need for continued efforts

Although external sources such as the Traavik Commission recognize these efforts of the NPSS to broaden its expertise, it is also emphasized a continued room for improvement in this area (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32). Notably, the amount of multidisciplinary expertise is currently 19% lower than the organization's Swedish counterpart, Säpo - an organization which tasks mostly are similar to those of the NPSS. According to the Traavik Commission, this indicates that the organization has in fact not managed to broaden its expertise *sufficiently* over recent years, even though this has been a stated objective of the organization throughout the past decade. The commission-report therefore restates the importance that the organization needs to take determined measures for further strengthening the broader expertise among its employees. More generally, the commission also notes that the NPSS has not given the

required priority to human resource development (HRD). In the commission's view, intense efforts are required in this area, including the development of an overall HRD-strategy (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5, 47). These deficiencies are, according to the commission, also evident at the level of management, where one needs to work more actively to develop leadership and recruit leaders with diverse professional and academic backgrounds. Currently, the majority of NPSS leaders are recruited from within the service, and the last Leadership Development Program in NPSS was concluded around 2006. This program involved all leaders within the organization, including those in the local units, but since then, there has been no targeted effort to develop leadership. Attaining the required leadership and broader expertise is in the commission's view regarded one of the major challenges of the NPSS (Traavikutvalget, 2012:20, 47).

The service prepared a strategic HRD-plan for the period 2009-2012, but according to the Traavik Commission, this plan has not been updated over the recent years. A new plan was initiated in 2013, and the service intends to develop a strategic 3-5 year plan from 2014 (Traavikutvalget, 2012:47).

Summary

The data material reflects high awareness within the organization of the need to increase the multidisciplinary expertise and recruit actively and broadly – as demonstrated through the public webpages and statements from knowledgeable sources such as Jørn Holme. Recruitment of multidisciplinary expertise has been a formally stated objective of the organization throughout the last decade, and from the sources identified in this study, one finds that the organization has developed significantly in the right direction compared to the status a decade ago. The number of educated specialist has nearly doubled from 2002 to 2011, while the number of analysts at the Central Unit has more than tripled - although from a quite modest level initially. However, in comparison to similar services of neighboring countries, it is still a question whether development has been sufficient. Especially noteworthy is it that the organization lags significantly behind from its Swedish counterpart, a service

which largely has the same tasks as the NPSS. Furthermore, the sources highlight a general lack in the strategic effort toward HRD in the NPSS, which could imply that personnel are not challenged with new perspectives and therefore remain rooted in cemented ways of thinking about threats. Although the service seems to be well on the way toward becoming a fundamentally multidisciplinary “knowledge organization”, is seems to be required a continued effort in this area, both with regard to recruitment as well as internal development of competence.

Potential drivers for change

The security environment and more specifically, the complexities in the threat scenario, can clearly be regarded a driver for change in this area. Central actors within and outside the organization perceived that the organization had to adapt in order to perform its tasks well under a new threat scenario. One might furthermore say that the management was faced with a kind of “crisis” in the wake of the Lund Commission-report, which added urgency to the efforts. External reviews, such as that of the Lund Commission might therefore have been essential in order to generate the sufficient awareness that something had to be done. The potential driving effect of external input is also supported in the findings of the Traavik Commission which highlights that the externally oriented parts of the organization seem to have developed more in a positive direction. It seems that the areas of the organization which are regularly under review by other actors have developed a culture for continuous improvement, among others by taking advantage of the opportunities that lie in vacant or new positions. In addition, Sefland’s determined measures during the early 2000s clearly indicate that sound leadership and direction from the top of the organization gave thrust to the first efforts of moving the organization in a more multidisciplinary direction.

Potential barriers for change

When Sefland initiated the first efforts toward broader recruitments, sources indicate that this initiative was met with some resistance internally. Organizational theory points to several reasons for resistance against change, most of these are related to the established cultures within the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:362-363).

Before the efforts of Sefland, the NPSS was heavily criticized for its closed culture, and many officials had then worked in the service over a long period of time. On this note, the Danielsen Committee argued that this stability in staffing could have lead to unproductive and cemented cultures. Research has demonstrated that employees of the same educational background will tend to ally with each other and develop an inclination to act and think alike within the organization. If the formal regulations of the organization conflicts with these developed standards, the trend is that employees will act according to their own developed standards, rather than the formally stated standards of the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:141). As most leaders are recruited from within the service, one could furthermore ask to what extent recruitment officers and leaders have a preference toward hiring police educated staff. For a service which historically has been a police organization, such self-reinforcing trends might indeed represent a barrier for fundamentally altering the actual recruitment of the service – an issue which often referred to as “path dependency”. As indicated by the Traavik Commission, there might exist internal variations between the various units, where certain units have developed a better culture for managing these changes than others, and to utilize new employments to supply the service with complementary expertize. However, in common for these units, is that they have a more extrovert role where their work is regularly reviewed by external actors which bring important correctives to the service. This might seem to support the hypothesis of path-dependency as a barrier in the more shrouded and introvert unit of the organization. With limited empirical support, this discussion will here only amount to speculations. Still, in closed organizations such as the NPSS these are indeed highly plausible barriers which deserve further examination and attention.

4.2.Proactive

Intelligence organizations need to be proactive and strategic in order to predict and unveil future threats and to understand their underlying causes in order to suggest preventative measures, including the ability to change focus and alter direction.

Indicators:

- *Statements of strategic perspective and attention to new threats*
- *Stated focus on root-causes*
- *Evidence of prevented threats*
- *Legal provisions or organizational amendments*

Strategic command and outlook

The recommendations of the Danielsen Committee emphasized that Norwegian interest in general had become more vulnerable to terrorism and sabotage and that the NPSS therefore had to be flexible with ability to adapt and plan towards the unknown (Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). In August 2004, Jørn Holme was appointed Chief of the NPSS for a fixed term of six years - a period in which the organization was to undertake several significant changes. In 2005, Holme suggested adjustments to the structure of the NPSS which was endorsed by the MoJ. The ministry added that the new organization had to be open, flexible, and offer good opportunities for ad-hoc organization of projects. Specifically, these changes implied that analysis and consultancy was strengthened considerably and that investigations were separated from intelligence and other preventive activities (PST, 2012; PST, n.d.). In an attempt to strengthen the strategic command of the service, Holme established a secretariat comprising experts within law, social science and policing. According to the Traavik commission, this secretariat took a central role for planning in relation to strategic trends and emerging threats. In perspective of the established indicators for proactivity, this provides evidence of organizational amendments which facilitated a more strategic outlook within the organization. However, after Holme left the position as chief in 2009 this secretariat function was discontinued. In this relation, the commission argues that the re-establishment of such a unit could represent an important contribution for ensuring that the NPSS increasingly focuses the overall strategic trends and new emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:19-20). More

generally, the commission argues that the Central Unit in Oslo largely stagnated after 2006, resulting in suboptimal performance.

Among the main problems is unsatisfactory cooperation and coordination between units and an excessive focus on the ongoing cases. In some situations, this may result in tunnel vision and cause that too little attention is given to the totality of threats and new emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:15, own translation).

Furthermore, the commission notes that;

The NPSS is still characterized by a static, tradition-bound organizational culture which not sufficiently emphasize and honors development, creativity and innovation. In the commissions view, this is perhaps the biggest challenge of the NPSS. In other words: the service has focused too much on the ongoing cases, and not sufficiently toward circumstances outside these cases. The service has lacked the ability to look up and capture patterns and changes within the big picture (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3, own translation).

In a situation where the threat scenario is becoming increasingly complex, a lack of strategic perspective heightens the risk of emerging threats going unnoticed.

According to the commission, this is particularly evident at the higher levels of command within the NPSS. The leadership team is said to have placed too much emphasis on the ongoing cases and has therefore not been able to exercise the strategic change management which is required. This narrow focus is also intensified by the management-dialogue with the MoJ, where questions of a general or strategic political character are not discussed to any significant degree (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3-4).

The 2012 internal evaluation of the NPSS goes far to confirm that the management-dialogue has mainly revolved around budget situations and orientations about ongoing cases. Therefore, there has been absence of dialogue on strategic developments and circumstances which falls outside the scope of the prioritized issues (PST, 2012:30-31).

These insights seem to indicate that the service has in fact not managed maintain the strategic perspective which is required in order to recognize potential new and

emerging issues in the broader threat environment. The external review from the Traavik Commission emphasizes that the service is dominated by a static and tradition-bound culture which hinders development in this area. This might indeed be closely related to the issue of path-dependency. Moreover, the commission highlights a fundamental lack of strategic leadership both within the organization as well as from the MoJ, thereby causing a narrow tunnel vision which heightens the risk of emerging threats going unnoticed. This indicates that sound direction and leadership is highly important in order to maintain the required strategic outlook, especially for an organization which is generally protected from other external correctives.

Difficult priorities within information-gathering

While the lack of strategic perspective seems closely related to matters of leadership, the data material also points toward internal struggles and resulting unproductive priorities. The NPSS has, in similar to other security and intelligence services, experienced that the amount of information has increased dramatically over the recent years. This upsurge is caused by a number of factors; technological developments which provide greater opportunities to obtain information, access to new and covert methods, and the Internet emerging as an increasingly important intelligence platform to mention a few. This presents the NPSS with some serious dilemmas in terms of what information to collect.

The service continuously needs to collect information to the ongoing cases and to the assessments it provides to a variety of decision-makers, but equally important, it needs to proactively gather information that could shed light on potential new emerging security threats. However, these objectives usually entail very different types of information (Traavikutvalget, 2013:23-24). NPSS-analysts are commonly placed either in the Department for Analysis or in the Operative Department. Analysts in the latter department spend most time working with the ongoing cases, while the Department for Analysis focuses on national threat assessments, thematic reports and other types of strategic decision support – which often of a more long-term perspective. The analysts in the two departments therefore usually have very different

information needs. Analysts at the Department for Analysis is entirely dependent that the Operative Department – which holds the main functions for information gathering - gives priority and allocates sufficient resources for collection to meet their information needs. Such strategic information gathering may in some cases involve operations over an extended period of time, targeting developments or environments which to the work of the Operative Department often may appear improbable or irrelevant (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26). Access to information regarding developments which so far has not been perceived as threatening could prove essential in order to detect and prevent a future threat. Still, in a pressured situation, this is usually not given sufficient priority in the Operative Department. The information needs of the Department for Analysis is therefore crushed under the need for information to the ongoing cases, with the consequence that the quality of the strategic assessments deteriorates (Traavikutvalget, 2012:22, 26, 32). This indicates that, although there is awareness for the need to focus on strategic trends in certain parts of the organization, this does not necessarily account for the organization as a whole.

While this to a certain extent is a question of resource-imposed priorities, it also indicates the existence of potentially unhealthy subcultures and internal struggles within the organization. As noted by the Traavik Commission, each employee seems to identify too much with his own department, and too little with the organization as a whole (Traavikutvalget, 2012:3-4). This might follow from the high degree of specialization within the NPSS which may result that employees regard their own tasks more important than other tasks within the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:140). In a situation where the Operative Department controls information gathering, one can therefore easily imagine that information needs in other parts of the organization are given lower priority.

More generally, both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission highlights that the two departments seem little aligned for the further development of the organization. There are also ambiguities in the roles of the departments, which occasionally results in duplication of effort. Considering that there are not enough

resources to meet all the information needs of the services at any time it is also here a question of strategic leadership to define what areas and developments that should be given priority and attention (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26, 32; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:385). However, as noted previously, it may seem that such leadership has been missing.

When NPSS-leadership make these priorities it is essential that the decision above all is based on the service's overarching goals, and to less extent the individual department's preferences. (...) The Committee believes it is vital that the NPSS devotes greater attention toward obtaining information about trends and developments which are not necessarily considered probable, such as underlying, potential or emerging threats (Traavikutvalget, 2012:26-27, own translation).

Both the Traavik-led commission and the July 22 Commission agree that the NPSS has significant potential for improvement in terms of processes for collection and management of a rising amount of information - arguing this should be a priority for the future (Traavikutvalget, 2012:24). This view is largely shared by the organization itself, where the NPSS internal evaluation reads;

The evaluation has revealed capacity issues with handling and assessing the large amount of information the service receives every day, and with making complete registrations and analyzes of people and events outside the ongoing cases (PST, 2012:30, own translation).

From the NPSS' internal investigation it is evident that the service today is forced to prioritize and work case oriented within the narrow range where existing threats are identified. Therefore, it is a challenge to generate the sufficient support for intelligence-based work outside the ongoing cases, and the effort to analyze trends and threat-related issues such as radicalization, travel activities, propaganda or capacity building, is therefore less extensive and less structured than suggested by today's threat situation. According to the evaluation, these challenges are particularly noticeable in dealing with threats from solo-terrorist, such as the perpetrator on 22/7. Managing such complex threats clearly requires more effort outside the established threats and ongoing cases than what is the case today (PST, 2012:30). As noted in the self-evaluation;

We see that the NPSS, due to resources and the way work processes are organized, is operating with a considerable degree of uncertainty in order to not identify new threats. The service is working very systematic and thorough in ongoing cases, but does not have the same systematics and attention to circumstances outside these cases. If nothing is changed, the degree of uncertainty will increase as a result of the developments within a gradually more complex and changeable threat scenario (PST, 2012:31, own translation).

From the sources in this section it appears that the service has not managed to attain the strategic and proactive formula which required for detecting potential new and emerging threats. While external sources draw attention to deficient leadership and narrow priorities within information gathering, internal sources frequently highlight resources as a barrier for the proactive effort of the NPSS.

Narrow priorities – a question of resources?

The analysis will not go into depth on numbers and budgets, but the resource situation undeniably deserves some attention as it, according to the service, has led to frequent and very difficult priorities (PST, 2012:30). Under Janne Kristiansen, who led the NPSS through three years until 2012, efforts to prevent and prevent terrorism from militant Islamist groups had the number one priority. Although some have criticized this one-sided focus, Kristiansen withholds that this priority was necessary and correct (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:355; Stortinget, 2012). In response to criticism about the limited focus at uncovering new threats, Kristiansen noted to the Storting in 2012:

In my view, this is a question of needed priorities, based on the threat situation we saw, and in light of a difficult resource situation (Stortinget, 2012, own translation).

Both Holme and Kristiansen express concern over a generally tight resource situation in terms of both investigation and prevention, resulting in tough priorities every day (Stortinget, 2012). In the graded self-evaluation, the NPSS described its resource situation as “critical”, highlighting that this has multiple and serious consequences for the preventive efforts. Specifically, the service is not able to devote considerable effort toward collection and analysis of information outside the high-priority cases.

Therefore, the organization as a whole is largely deprived of the ability to systematically and over time build an understanding of developments in the broader threat environment (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:382; Stormark, 2013a).

Since 9/11, the NPSS have generally been high on the priorities of the political Norway, resulting that budgets have increased steadily (Østgaard, 2012:8). Still, there is little doubt that a fundamentally proactive effort would place great demands on the resources of the service. Kjetil Stormark argues that the service will need at least 100-150 more employees in order to gain capacity to unveil new threats at an early stage (Stormark, 2013a). Both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission found that the resource situation might pose a barrier for the effort of the service. Still, they both emphasize that the NPSS probably can get considerably more out of their current resources. In this relation, it is underlined that the calls for increased resources should not stand in the way of the significant improvements which in fact can be implemented without the supply of additional funding (Traavikutvalget, 2012:44; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:393). Knut Fosli at the MoJ argues that the NPSS has not been sufficiently proactive in the efforts to develop its own organization. He finds that the service often respond to new challenges by asking for more resources, rather than focusing on how the organization itself can adapt in response to its new premises (Fosli, 2012:11). Adjustments in leadership, culture, methods and work processes represent only some of the initiatives which might improve the priorities and guide the focus of employee's attention without extensive use of resources. The current Chief of the NPSS, Marie Benedicte Bjørnland, largely confirms this view. She argues that there is great potential for further developing the methods for preventing threats, and that much can be done within the existing framework (Norges Politilederslag, 2013).

The dilemma between intelligence and individual rights

Any discussion of proactivity from the side of intelligence agencies cannot be detached from the legal and ethical foundations for the agencies effort. Not surprisingly, the legal constraints on the NPSS are a recurring theme in the data material of this study. In 1999, the Norwegian Government appointed the so-called

Sårbarhetsutvalget - a committee mandated to assess the vulnerabilities of the Norwegian society. The following year, the committee presented a series of recommendations in order to strengthen efforts toward community security and preparedness. Among its recommendations, the committee stated that:

It should be established legal provisions that provide the NPSS with opportunities for offensive preventive efforts (*Sårbarhetsutvalget*, 2000:14, own translation).

Although new laws have been introduced over the last decade, sources indicate that the legal basis might still remain a constraining factor for the NPSS to fulfill its duties according to expectations. Specifically, the service itself argues that the existing legal framework is insufficient to deal with threats from new issues such as solo-terrorism (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:392). Still, considering the fundamental values of the Norwegian society, one could also ask whether it is desirable to set the NPSS capable of doing so. This draws attention to several enduring tradeoffs - related to the balance between openness and security, between trust and control, and between the governments need for surveillance and the individual's right for freedom. According to the July 22 Commission, the democratic costs will be too big if the ambition is eliminating any threat to the society. In other words, the society will always have to tolerate a certain amount of risk. Furthermore, the commission notes that today's legal framework already reflects the Parliament's balancing of the dilemma between surveillance and individual rights (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:450).

Back in 2005, the Norwegian Parliament addressed recommendations of a committee mandated to examine the methods of the Norwegian police. This resulted in an expansion of methods, and the door was now opened for methods which previously only associated with investigations, to also be used in relation to preventive activities. The rationale behind these changes was to improve the odds to prevent and avert terrorism and other serious threats on an earlier stage than what had previously been possible (PST, n.d.). These new legal provisions can be seen in relation to a general trend in which Norwegian security took a more proactive form after 2001. Before the

9/11-attacks, the Norwegian Government combated terrorism exclusively within a juridical model, where acts of terrorism were punished through ordinary provisions such as deliberate murder, violence, vandalism, or threats to national security. This meant that the action had to be *completed* in order for it to be punished, and naturally, it could then no longer be prevented by the means available to the NPSS. After 2001 however, the Norwegian approach to such acts took a far broader approach, whereas terrorism also received its own penal provision in Norwegian law. The changes gave the NPSS access to preventive methods in order to uncover and, if possible, prevent serious attacks on the nation *in the unfolding*, and *before* the act itself was committed. This legal base separate the NPSS from the regular police and provides the service with unique preventative responsibilities (Holme, 2009:172, 182; Bergersen, 2012:54-55, 59).

In perspective of the developed indicators, this demonstrates that the NPSS over the last decade has received new legal provisions to facilitate a more proactive effort of intelligence. In 2009, Jørn Holme revealed that around 70% of the resources were dedicated to the preventive activities of the service, including proactive efforts to prevent conditions which might radicalize young people into militant Islamist groups (Holme, 2009:179). Holme argues that the new methods adopted in 2005 were important in many cases and contributed to prevent different types of attacks on Norwegian security (Stortinget, 2012). These statements not only provide evidence that the new legal provisions contributed to impede threats, they also indicate that the NPSS focuses on the root-causes of threats and work proactively in order to avert potential threats from becoming real.

According to Holme, the expansion in the legal framework was to withstand both “good and bad days”, indicating that there are indeed limits for how far one can push the methods for surveillance and intelligence in a democracy. Looking back to 2005, Holme noted to the Norwegian Parliament in 2012;

Would we, contrary to expectation, experience a terrorist attack, the NPSS-chief should not demand new and comprehensive legislation for monitoring. These had already been given (Stortinget, 2012, own translation).

While this might indicate that equilibrium has been found, there is little doubt that developments within IT have presented the service with new challenges when it comes to uncovering threats. In this relation, the July 22 Commission recommends that the existing regulations for intrusive methods such as monitoring should have its parallel in a regulation for the efforts in cyberspace (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:460). The service itself has expressed concern that today's regulatory framework does not take in account the need for effective methods for IT-based information gathering, and when it comes to collecting and storing information from open sources, the regulation is claimed to be inadequate and not adapted to the current situation (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:46). The July 22 Commission argue that the objective of protection against terrorism might justify certain new legal provisions, granting the NPSS access to further information-gathering and sharing. However, it is stressed that the restrictions set in respect of democracy and privacy need to be preserved (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:48).

Clearly, the data material suggests that ambiguities and lack of development in the regulatory framework might have constrained the proactive effort to uncover threats, especially with regard to IT-based collection and analysis of information. However, sources also indicate that internal factors have detained this effort.

Outdated methods and working-procedures

In 2012, Minister of Justice Grete Faremo, pointed out that the NPSS itself had indicated that the service “*did not see the Internet emerging as such an important information channel as it has proven to be*”. In an interview with the July 22 Commission, Faremo notes that the NPSS self-evaluation following 22/7 illustrates an organization which has continued too long in established working procedures. Faremo, which newly arrived from the position as Minister of Defense, believes that the sharp missions of the Norwegian Armed Forces is what literally brought the foreign

intelligence service “up on its toes” in terms of required competence, methods, and the need to understand evolvments in the threat environment. She argues that even though the NPSS has done a good job, it might have been more sheltered than the NIS in terms of realizing the tough requirements for its organization (Faremo, 2012:9). To take the Internet as an example - representing a huge source of information about activities in the community, the NIS was early to establish a sophisticated special unit for so-called open-source intelligence. The NPSS however, has lagged behind in this development, and it was only until 2010 that the service established a unit for digital information retrieval. This indicates that the service has been slow to undertake the necessary organizational amendments to facilitate a more proactive effort. The commission believes that the service, even before receiving the earmarked allocations, should have given higher priority to open-source intelligence than what has been the case. Therefore, significant efforts are now required in order to appear relevant in light of developments in this area (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:390). With regard to barriers for development, the lack of crises and external incentives might have resulted that the methods of service has somewhat stagnated. Although the threat of terrorism against Norway has been acknowledged as steadily increasing, there had prior to 22/7 been no terrorist attacks or significant crises on Norwegian soil. Just like external shocks or crises might be a driving force for development, its absence might in this case have hindered the progress toward developing the new and necessary methods.

According to the Traavik Commission, the NPSS should give higher priority to developing its preventive methods within the existing legal framework. The commission acknowledges that there are ongoing efforts to develop methods in important parts of the service, but still suggests that the preventive methods of the NPSS are not sufficiently innovative and proactive (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31).

For the NPSS to be an effective security service, the service's preventative activities needs to be based on a wide range of measures, or - if you will - a comprehensive toolkit. The Committee considers it utmost important that NPSS continuously develop both its overt and covert preventative activities (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31, own translation).

It is recommended that the service should devote sufficient resources and establish good processes in order to maximize propulsion in this effort. The commission believes that a stronger focus in this area will contribute to enhance the results and reputation of the NPSS (Traavikutvalget, 2012:31).

A culture of precaution

The revelations of the Lund Commission delivered an uppercut to the reputation of the NPSS, and according to several observers, this has contributed to what can be termed a *culture of precaution* within the service. Addressing the Storting in 2012, Janne Kristiansen emphasized that it is decisive for a security service to stay within the legal framework which is set, but equally is it important to capitalize on the potential that the framework offers the service. Kristiansen states she was aware of the so-called culture of precaution which had developed in the wake of the Lund Commission's report in 1996, and claim that specific measures were implemented in order to counteract this culture. Jørn Holme notes that the Lund Commission represented a close reminder of an overenthusiastic intelligence service, which often did too much rather than too little. Following the scandals, the Storting strengthened the EOS Committee considerably, including regular inspections of the methods, registrations and monitoring of the service. In this relation, Holme states that:

The NPSS was often criticized for legally unauthorized registrations, and I cannot disregard that this might have contributed to a culture of precaution in order to avoid criticism (Stortinget, 2012, own translation).

Both Holme and Kristiansen argue that the strong monitoring from the EOS Committee and the resulting fear of being held responsible to criticism might have caused that personnel did not dare to register information into the systems. As Kristiansen puts it:

The organization wants to do things correctly. It is about very competent, but also very decent people, who want to do their job within the rules that are set, and who think it is tough being criticized for having done wrong. Therefore, one seeks to do everything correctly, and in such cases it is only human to retreat a little (Stortinget, 2012, own translation).

These statements indicate that the tight external control of the service, might also pose a barrier when it comes to developing the proactivity which required in today's complex threat environment. It seems that the fear of criticism from the environment has nurtured an unfortunate culture within the organization, meaning that the service is not able to capitalize on the potential offered within the existing legal framework. As highlighted by Morten Ruud, the consequence of this culture might be that the NPSS disregard developments which should have been captured (Ruud, 2012:10). In this relation, the July 22 Commission states that it is particularly important that the service exhibit greater determination, creativity and willingness to identify new threats (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:459). Holme claim that the service should review the regulations and perhaps consider lowering the bar for registrations in order to be able to capture disturbing developments relating to issues and persons which are not previously recognized as actual threats (Stortinget, 2012). Marie Benedicte Bjørnland, acknowledges that the repeated criticism of the service has impacted the culture of the organization, but she also argues that dealing with this fundamentally is a question of leadership (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). Leaders of organizations may take a number of concrete measures in order to develop and affect organizational culture, and lack of such leadership might in this regard be considered a potential obstacle to development (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:134-136).

Summary

The material largely reflects an internal awareness of the need to be proactive and focus on strategic trends and the fundamental causes of potential threats. This is especially highlighted through statements of past and current leaders of the service. Still, both the internal and external sources indicate that the NPSS has not managed to adapt sufficiently according to this requirement. More specifically, it is shown that the service, due to inadequate leadership, unbalanced priorities and unproductive cultures, has not managed to devote sufficient attention to the strategic picture and potential new and emerging threats. Within the service, it seems that resources are often regarded the main challenge for developing a more proactive and strategic outlook,

while other sources generally underline that much can be done within the existing conditions. Regardless of the causes, the sources seem to be aligned that the current methods, perspectives and procedures are not as proactive as the current threat scenario would suggest. Although certain legal ambiguities remain, especially with regard to IT-based intelligence, the material reflects that the service has not capitalized on the potential of the legal framework. All in all, this heightens the risk that new and emerging threats might go unnoticed.

Potential drivers for change

From the material it appears that the threat scenario is the principal catalyst for the increased awareness of the need for a proactive and strategic effort. In addition, the introduction of new laws and regulations has clearly contributed to a more proactive effort, which according to the leaders, has contributed to avert several potential threats against the Norwegian society. Structural amendments might also contribute to the maintenance of the organization's strategic outlook, as witnessed in the secretariat function which was established under Holmes leadership, but which later was dissolved. According to the Traavik Commission, this unit contributed to lift the perspectives within the organization toward strategic trends and developments – thereby increasing the odds for observing new, emerging threats. According to Grete Faremo, “sharp missions” was a catalyst which in time brought the NIS “up on its toes”. But since the NPSS traditionally has been more sheltered from such external motivations, the organization has not realized the tough requirements that are placed upon the organization today. This indicates that the absence external motivations have caused stagnation within the NPSS. In this relation, external shocks and crises such as 22/7 might represent a driving force for developing a more proactive organization.

Potential barriers for change

The material indicates several potential barriers for developing a fundamentally proactive effort within the NPSS. In general it indicates a tendency where internal sources highlight resources and legal constraints as their greatest barriers, while external sources generally emphasize matters concerning leadership and culture.

Leaders of the service have expressed great concern over a critical resource situation which forces the service to work narrowly and case-oriented, thus reducing the attention towards identifying new developments and emerging threats. Furthermore, the NPSS argues that the existing legal framework is insufficient to deal with threats from new issues such as solo-terrorism. On the other hand, the external reviews after 22/7 and several other sources emphasize that the service should do more to develop its processes within the boundaries of the existing legal framework, and that calls for increased resources should not stand in the way of the significant improvements which in fact can be implemented without the supply of additional funding.

The external sources also emphasize that the organization has lacked the strategic leadership which is required both within the organization and in the dialogue with the MoJ. The lack of strategic leadership and direction from the top of the organization might to some extent result that the various departments, dominated by diverging focus and perspectives, are left to “battle it out” with regard to where resources should be used and which issues deserve the focus of the organization. The result seems to be that some tasks are offered significant attention while others go largely ignored. This internal fight for resources might be closely related to the high degree of specialization which naturally follows these types of organizations. Within the various departments, employees devote their efforts to narrowly defined tasks and usually seem to engage little with those matters that are not related to their own responsibilities and assignments. The departments will naturally orientate toward information that is relevant to their business and ignore everything else. Employees therefore end up weighing their own task as more important than other (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:139-140). The external sources indicate that the focus today is largely based on the preferences of individual departments, rather than the overarching goals of the service. This might not only lead to biased priorities or duplication of efforts, but also result in a situation where the various departments are not aligned with regard to the future direction of organization - which as also noted by the Traavik Commission.

External sources also emphasize the organization's generally static and tradition-bound organizational culture, an issue that might be closely related to the issue of path-dependency discussed in the previous section. More generally, this implies that new initiatives to develop the organization are not sufficiently emphasized and valued. This might also be a reason why the external reviews find that little attention is devoted to expand the methods and perspectives of the service within the existing legal framework. Furthermore, several sources draw attention to the so-called "post-Lund syndrome", denoting the fear of criticism and corrections from the EOS Committee. In this way, external input might in fact also have adverse consequences for the culture of the organization, in this case resulting in the service not being able to capitalize on the potential offered within the legal framework. Still, certain internal and external sources emphasize that this barrier is something which should and could be managed through sound leadership.

The material indicates that the legal framework, although developed significantly in the post-9/11 period, still needs to be revisited. This is especially relevant when it comes to collection and analysis of information on new arenas such as the Internet. However, due to the enduring tradeoffs between freedom and security, the legal boundaries of a democratic society like Norway will to some extent always present barriers for the proactive efforts of the intelligence services. Certain sources, such as Holme, seem to indicate that equilibrium already has been found, and that extensive new provisions might imply too big democratic costs.

4.3.Open and transparent

The intelligence organizations need to be as open and transparent as possible, in order to maintain community confidence in their efforts.

Indicators:

- *Stated awareness and clear strategy for openness*
- *Active communication*
- *Information is easy accessible*
- *Public appearances*
- *Declassification of information*

Determined steps toward openness

After the Danielsen report in 1998, initial steps were taken in order to make the NPSS more open and transparent towards the society. The report emphasized that NPSS in general should display greater transparency on threat scenarios, tasks and activities, suggesting that general extracts of threat assessments should be made public. To a greater extent than before, it should now be openly expressed which activities and what environments that receive the attention of NPSS. It was also recommended that the grading practices within the service should be reviewed (PST, 2002; Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). In 2002, an information unit was established for the purpose of internal and external communication, and the NPSS started releasing an abridged public version of the annual threat assessment in order to offer society insight into its work and effort (PST, 2002; PST, 2012b). This demonstrates that the service early in the 2000s took determined steps toward more openness. Furthermore, it indicates that external reviews might represent a central driver for developing more openness, in this case represented by the Danielsen Committee.

After appointed Chief of the NPSS in 2004, Jørn Holme became a central advocate for increased openness, resulting in the service gradually appearing as more visible and willing to share information with the general public. By 2008, the service was present and available on social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, thus enabling a more regular communication with the media and society (Holme, 2009:175-177). During his leadership, Holme invited the press inside NPSS headquarters, participated in public

debates, and announced the actual number of people the service was following closely. With respect to the developed indicators for openness, this demonstrates both active communication and more public appearances from the side of the service. Due to his efforts for opening the service toward the society, Holme was in 2007 assigned the *Award of Communication* from the Norwegian Communication Association (Nettavisen, 2009; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2010). Holme argues that the new openness was important in order to restore the confidence in the work of the service, and to build trust and legitimacy in the broader population. He underlines that trust is decisive for the effort of the NPSS, as it allows for communication with individuals (Holme, 2009:165). This indicates that the increased openness is more than a mere response to the calls of the society, but also a conscious strategy for achieving one of the benefits of community confidence, namely access to information – one of the central preconditions for effective intelligence. In this relation, Holme initiated a reputation survey in 2008 that revealed the NPSS good reputation and high confidence among the public. According to Holme, these were welcome results which demonstrated that the conscious transformation with emphasis on openness and transparency had paid off (Holme, 2009:181).

Continued openness – contradictions and challenges

In parts of the organization, the enthusiasm toward the new openness-strategy has been limited, and the material highlights numerous challenges on this pathway. Certain NPSS-officials feared that the new openness and Holme's many public quirks could result in the flow of information from cooperating services drying out in the fear of leakages. According to former Chief of Defense, Sverre Diesen, certain officials within the NIS "nearly developed a rash" when hearing of the new openness-culture. Lasse Roen, who has been employee representative within the NPSS since 2007, argues that Jørn Holme did great things for the service, but also confirms that the new culture was a root of concern within the organization (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). Increased openness might clearly heighten the risk for unintended exposure of classified information, as seen when Janne Kristiansen in early 2012 resigned from her post after what has been termed "a serious breach in confidentiality" during a

parliamentary open hearing. Kristiansen had by then largely confirmed that the NIS has operators in Pakistan - a leak which undoubtedly could undermine cooperating services confidence in the NPSS (Nettavisen, 2012). These insights might indicate that while leadership and conscious strategies might represent a driving force for increased openness and transparency, the increased risk of compromising classified information may similarly breed skepticism within and outside the organization and thus hinder the developments in this direction. The balancing between intelligence openness and secrecy is clearly a topic riddled with difficult trade-offs and contradictions.

In 2012, Head of Communication Martin Bernsen posted an entry titled *The NPSS and Openness* on the webpage of the service. In this entry, Bernsen largely presents the organization's strategy for openness – explaining what the service can and cannot be open about. This can clearly be related to the indicators of active communication and stated awareness. Bernsen highlights that the NPSS over the last decade has moved from being a closed police unit to become a more open security service.

Transparency about security challenges was accentuated after the terrorist attacks against the United States 11 September 2001 and was no less relevant for NPSS after the acts of terror on 22 July 2011 (PST, 2012b, own translation).

Due to this development, the NPSS is now more accessible to the media and those using web-based social platforms. Today, the service actively operates its own website, in addition to being present on social media's like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter and Flickr. In general, Bernsen argues that the media has played, and does play, a significant role for the service becoming more communicative toward the society - illustrated by the number of media inquiries which have skyrocketed in recent years. In 2004, the NPSS received about 100 media inquiries, while the same figure for 2011 landed at about 2000. Although inquiries like these not necessarily leads to more transparency, Bernsen recognize them as important drivers which constantly challenge and stimulate the organization to a greater awareness of its communication – which in several cases has resulted in increased openness from the side of the service

(PST, 2012b). This reveals that the media can be regarded one central driver for increased openness.

However, Bernsen also draws attention to the many dilemmas that the organization faces on its pathway toward transparency. In some cases, the service needs to withhold information which potentially can be misinterpreted or exaggerated by the media, or misused to perform criminal acts. In addition, legislations present a number of formal constraints for transparency, and there are several sensitive aspects and obstacles embedded in the cooperation with other countries' security services. Bernsen therefore underlines that communication just for the sake of communicating would be counterproductive - breeding confusion rather than knowledge. Therefore, the strategy of the NPSS is that all communication should have its purpose and take in account the recipient's prospect for understanding it (PST, 2012b).

This generally reveals a high degree of awareness of the requirement for transparency within the NPSS today. Evident is also an increased ability to actually be more open, accessible and communicative toward the society and the media. Notably, this is demonstrated through the substantial engagement on web-based platforms, and more generally, through a rising number of public appearances and increased presence within the public domain. The increased openness is also reflected in the public threat assessments, where a quick word count reveals that the assessment for 2002 comprised around 1100 words, while the same assessment for 2013 counts nearly 4500 words (PST, 2002; PST, 2013). In similar to Holme, Bernsen points to openness as a conscious strategy for strengthening the community's confidence in their effort, something which the organization relies on in order to perform its tasks effectively (PST, 2012b). This is especially relevant as that the Traavik Commission found that the NPSS, in certain parts of society, suffers significantly from credibility issues, meaning that its work is not always appreciated according to merit. Although often rooted in the past mistakes and controversies of the service, it is noted that the public debate of the NPSS tends to be more on the negative side rather than the positive. This is reinforced by the fact that it is difficult for the service to inform the public of its

achievements and results, for example when it comes to identifying and preventing possible terrorist attacks. The evidence for intelligence effectiveness occurs when successfully preventing something that has yet to happen. The persistent negative focus on the NPSS is often perceived as a burden for the organization's highly qualified and dedicated staff, and according to the Traavik Commission, this has evidently contributed to the culture of precaution which discussed under the previous section (Traavikutvalget, 2012:9).

Many NPSS-employees also feel that politicians often communicate unreasonable expectations for the service considering its resources and legal framework. They emphasize the need for clarifications which could give the public a clearer and more realistic understanding of what can be expected of the NPSS. On this basis, the Traavik Commission recommends that the government should convey a more nuanced picture of the possibilities and limitations in dealing with today's threats. However, it is stressed that the service itself needs to contribute significantly to this effort; through maximum transparency and accessibility, through an offensive communication-strategy, and through an improved utilization of the possibilities offered by the modern information society (Traavikutvalget, 2012:9-10). In Report No. 21 (2012-2013) to the Storting, the Norwegian Government agrees that the NPSS needs to be as open as possible regarding the conditions for its efforts as well as its performance and results (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:47).

Based on the recommendations of the abovementioned report and the recommendations of the Traavik Commission, the NPSS in May 2013 decided to declassify and publicly display information related to the overall use of resources in 2011 and 2012 (PST, 2013a). In relation to the indicators, this demonstrates that the NPSS is willing to declassify information which may be of interest to the public. Furthermore, the episode illustrates that external reviews and input from the government can be regarded potential drivers for increased openness from the service.

The role of the EOS Committee

Looking back to the recommendations of the Danielsen Committee, measures were implemented in order to prevent future scandals like those documented by the Lund Commission, herein strengthening the systematic control through the EOS Committee. The service also developed new internal regulations, thereby tightening the control over operational activities to ensure that privacy and legal rights were not violated (Traavikutvalget, 2012:11, Holme, 2009:171-172). Since 2001, the EOS Committee's annual report has offered roughly 6 pages to the scrutiny of the NPSS, mainly concerning the legality of methods and registrations. Although the report from the EOS Committee to some extent has caused more public insight into the work of the NPSS, Janne Kristiansen argues that these reports and the way they are made public is problematic. In similar to the effects of the Lund Commission's report, she claims that the reports contribute to reinforce the culture of precaution within the service. Personally, Kristiansen claims that the requirement for openness around the service has gone a bit too far. She notes that, while the government calls for more transparency, this can also make the service vulnerable as many aspects need to be protected from disclosure. The service will never be able to provide the public with a comprehensive picture, and the small proportion of information it actually can give will often cause public speculations (Kristiansen, 2012:14).

Summary

There is little doubt that intelligence and openness is a relationship riddled with contradictions. It should be clear that openness in relation to intelligence organizations is not a question of full transparency. Rather it is a question of finding the right balance between safeguarding sensitive matters while maintaining the public trust in the agencies. In this sense, the analysis has found that the NPSS has come very far. Significant developments includes the will to be more open about the activities and resources of the service, the release of public threat assessments, the annual report of the EOS Committee, the presence in social media as well as an increasing number of public appearances from leaders and representatives within the service. Not surprisingly, the material indicates that the challenges for openness are mainly evident

in the nature of NPSS being a secret service with a following need to protect much of its information and its sources.

Potential drivers for change

The findings highlight several potential drivers for increased openness. Several sources underline the significant benefits that follow from openness as one driving force. This indicates that openness is a rational strategy based on the reasoning that community confidence is a precondition for intelligence which serves to increase the access to information. In this view, leadership effort such as the initiatives of Jørn Holme might provide significant thrust to such strategies. Other internal sources, such as Martin Bernsen, emphasize that the media undeniably plays a central role in pushing the service toward more openness, especially through constantly challenging the organization to be more aware of its communication and the need for openness. In addition, correctives and recommendations from external commissions and the government have in several cases stimulated openness, among others this was demonstrated by the release of annual public threat assessment following the recommendations from the Danielsen Committee, and the declassification of information based on the recommendations of the government and the Traavik Commission.

Potential barriers for change

With regard to openness, the material draws attention to several potential barriers for development. Several internal sources explain that Jørn Holme's offensive strategy for openness was a root for concern within the NPSS. Some feared that the openness culture would risk compromising classified information, which could weaken the trust in NPSS as a partner and result that information from informants and cooperating services dried out. In certain cases, release of classified information might even be misused for criminal purposes. The inherent contradiction between intelligence and openness means that the service continuously is balancing on a knife edge. Although the media in general is highlighted as one of the driving forces for openness, the nature of mass media might also pose barriers the efforts toward openness. On some

occasions, the service might withhold information which are relevant to the public due to a fear that media might exaggerate, misinterpret or misuse the information with the purpose of creating headlines to sell newspapers. Openness could in such instances lead to public mistrust and speculations, which would be counterproductive for the service, meaning that the information might breed confusion and fear, rather than enlightenment.

4.4.Close dialogue with decision-makers

Intelligence services and political decision-makers need to maintain a short and clear chain of command. Today's complex environment necessitates new standards for communication between intelligence services and a variety of political decision-makers.

Indicators:

- *Clear chains of communication*
- *Provides support to high-level decision-makers and the wider government*
- *Government officials recognize the value of intelligence*

The dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS

Following the findings of the Danielsen Committee, it was recommended that the NPSS needed stronger connections with the governmental level. Specifically, the Committee found that;

The government should increasingly take responsibility for the overall management of the NPSS in areas outside investigations. Ensuring that threats scenarios and the overall priorities of the service are established at a high political level would, in the committee's opinion, represent the most significant improvement and the most important measure in order to avoid unfortunate dispositions in the future (Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998, own translation).

On this background, future arrangements needed to ensure that the political level in greater extent issued guidelines for the work of the NPSS. A model was adopted where the NPSS drafted an overall yearly threat assessment with the contribution of other actors and disciplines such as the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Defense Intelligence Staff, research establishments and several other relevant stakeholders. The assessment would then treated in the joint

collaborative Committee for Coordination and Advice (KRU), and subsequently by the MoJ, before submitted to the Norwegian Government's Security Council (RSU) (PST, 2002; Justis- og politidepartementet, 1998). As the NPSS is subordinated the MoJ, it is the ministry that is responsible for determining the threat level in Norway – based on the threat assessments of the NPSS. The service is obliged to report to the MoJ on “everything of importance” (Østgaard, 2012:5). With regard to indicators for development, this demonstrates the establishment of chains for communication between the NPSS and its parent ministry for the assessment of threats.

In spite of the measures to strengthen the relations between the service and the ministerial level during the early 2000s, a study by Stein-Fredrik Kynø in 2007 concluded that connections still seemed to be insufficient. In relevance to the indicator of government officials recognizing the value of intelligence, Kynø found an increasing awareness within the government about the ability of intelligence to provide support for Norway's decision-makers. Still, he highlights that the general understanding and appreciation of intelligence and its potential still seemed limited within the political environment. Notably, to many government institutions and administrators, the process for obtaining access to intelligence appeared overly complicated and time-consuming. Furthermore, Kynø found that many politicians regard intelligence more as a “cloak and dagger” activity, rather than a useful and supportive tool in policy making. On this background, Kynø concluded that the Norwegian model was probably not the most efficient, and that the connection between executive power and the intelligence services were not close and tight enough to meet the security demands of the future (Kynø, 2007:76, 79-80, 82).

This is also reflected in statements of intelligence researcher and former intelligence officer, Vegard Valther Hansen. Hansen argues that Norway fundamentally lacks the strategic culture where intelligence services report to the top, and that the understanding of threats at the higher levels therefore is limited.

The Norwegian intelligence services have in many ways been running their own business, without politicians bothering particularly. The real strategists – which situated at the Prime Minister's Office and within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - have seldom had anything to do with the services (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46, own translation).

The recent external reviews after 22/7 also indicate a continued room for improvement in this area. Among others, the Traavik Commission notes that:

The general impression is that the Ministry of Justice has not been particularly concerned about how to make best possible use of the NPSS. It appears that the ministry lacks the necessary commissioning competence (Traavikutvalget, 2012:17, own translation).

In other words, it is argued that the MoJ does not have the ability to define and describe its preferences and needs in a way that allows the NPSS to follow up in a satisfactory and politically relevant manner. The commission also emphasize that the management dialogue between the ministry and the NPSS fundamentally deficits from the required element of strategic leadership, and that the MoJ has not sufficiently contributed to strengthen coordination across other sectors. The commission therefore recommends that the MoJ should develop its overarching and strategic commissioning competence, and request information from NPSS which can be used by various decision-makers at the higher level more systematically. While this ultimately is a responsibility of the Ministry, the commission claims little doubt that the NPSS both could and should have shown greater initiative and contributed more actively to strengthen the MoJs ability to capitalize on the competence of the service. In addition, the dialogue between the two should focus more on strategic, long-term developments, and less on the ongoing cases and the methods of the service (Traavikutvalget, 2012:17-18).

While these findings seem to indicate that the dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS is not optimal, they are somewhat contradictive to the statements of the previous chiefs of the NPSS. In 2012, both Jørn Holme and Janne Kristiansen emphasized that the contact and dialogue with the MoJ and the Minister of Justice had overall been very

good. Although appeals for more resources were not always heard, both leaders experienced that the MoJ was genuinely interested in the work of the service (Stortinget, 2012).

The role of the MoJ

As Deputy Director General of the Police Department at the MoJ, Knut Fosli outlines the scope of the work toward the NPSS. In an interview with the July 22 Commission, Fosli estimated around 4 full-time equivalent's having the NPSS as its primary responsibility. The personnel are variously educated, but according to Fosli, the department has limited experience or knowledge within security policy, something which had been requested by the NPSS. Fosli explains that the Lund Commission-report induced a new culture within the department - a culture where one generally took more distance from the NPSS. Therefore, the department did not have a tradition for any substantial engagement with the service. When it comes to issuing and discussing priorities for the focus of the service, Fosli claims that the structure of this arrangement is good and that the Ministry generally played a quite active role in frequent discussions concerning the priorities of the service. However, he notes that the Ministry would benefit if the service could be more open in the dialogue about what they were working on (Fosli, 2012:7). Fosli further states that the service probably would prefer if the Ministry was more actively engaged in terms of new developments and trends, and that it more clearly defined its preferences. However, this has proved difficult under a strained budget situation. This seems to indicate that the MoJ potentially could have been a better dialogue partner if they had more resources. In Fosli's view, the ministry should ideally take a stronger role as a commissioner for the NPSS, as this is closely related to the government's ability to deal with threats and the ability to see the public interest in relation to new developments (Fosli, 2012:9-10).

These insights are reaffirmed in several other interviews with personnel within the MoJ. Special Advisor and former Secretary General, Morten Ruud, recognizes the NPSS' need for a proficient sparring partner and understands that the service requests

a more overarching, strategic perspective from the ministry. Ruud argues that this issue, to some extent, is a result of limited resources (Ruud, 2012:7, 10). Deputy Secretary General Hans O. Østgaard, who led the NPSS from 93 to 97, wishes that more resources were devoted to the dialogue with the NPSS, especially since the NPSS' budgets and general activity has increased significantly over the past 5-7 years. Østgaard acknowledge that the ministry has limited contributions to offer when it comes to the strategic priorities of the service, and that the goals suggested by the NPSS in the management dialogue often remain unchanged. In this way, the service practically functions as self-regulating. On basis of the dialogue and threat assessments of the service, the Ministry each year drafts a prioritized list of tasks which the NPSS should perform according to budget. This is the ministry's strategic message to the service, where preventive measures against terrorism for several years have been the main priority. Østgaard acknowledge that the NPSS might want more precise assignments, but notes that the ministry often finds it difficult to give precise guidance on general preventive measures (Østgaard, 2012:5-6). This is also reflected in interviews with Director General Hans Sverre Sjøvold. He explains that it is difficult for the ministry to manage the priorities and goals of the NPSS, and although the documents are developed at the ministerial level, it is in many ways the service itself that issues guidelines for the strategic management. Highlighting the ministry's lack of professional understanding in security related issues, Sjøvold argues that a considerable strengthening of competence is required for the ministry to be a worthy sparring partner for NPSS (Sjøvold, 2012:5).

Support to other parts of the government

With regard to indicators of the ability to support decision-making within the wider government, the analysis has found limited and somewhat diverging evidence. Back in 2000, Sårbarhetsutvalget highlighted that there are many governmental institutions which has significant needs for updated information on relevant threats and therefore should have easy access to related intelligence. Meanwhile, the report also noted that Norwegian public administration has little tradition to utilize intelligence in its decision making (Sårbarhetsutvalget, 2000:254). In 2012, Janne Kristiansen stated that

other sectors generally expressed great interest toward the threat assessments of the service, especially in the half-yearly gatherings of *Total-defense-forum* (Totalforsvarsforum), which is an important meeting arena for civil and military leaders with security and preparedness responsibilities (Kristiansen, 2012:5). Hans O. Østgaard describes that members of the KRU once every month held a briefing which opened for discussions around the threat scenario. Matters that were found relevant were reported to the respective ministries. According to Østgaard, the MoJ clearly has a responsibility to ensure that the various sectors realize the threat scenario which presented by the NPSS, and he explains that the ministry works actively to spread the public assessments around to the other ministries. However, Østgaard notes that many actors at this level do not seem to have knowledge of how to make use of these assessments (Østgaard, 2012:6-7). This is further elaborated by Director General for the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB), John A. Lea. He explains that the NPSS threat assessments are often very general in nature, which makes them hard to operationalize for a specific distribution of responsibilities. However, Lea also notes that the service has recently become more focused on how to produce more specific threat assessments (Lea, 2012:5).

Generally, the NPSS have experienced little interest and low demand for their sector-specific analyses, among others from the oil-sector, which according to the service has several vulnerabilities and should therefore be more proactive and request their assessment. Østgaard agrees that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in this relation could have “done more”. To him it seems that the matters which are within the government’s responsibility in this area are not considered urgent enough to ask for support from the NPSS. Therefore, it is largely left to the companies themselves to take measures against threats and potential espionage against their industry (Østgaard, 2012:6-7). In September 2013, the NPSS distributed a classified report entitled “Extremism in Norway” via the Contact Group for the Prevention of Terrorism. The purpose of the report is to make municipalities, various government agencies, and ministries better able to protect themselves against extremism and prevent future terrorism. In the media, this report was largely considered to be a response to the

criticisms of the Traavik Commission that highlighted a lack of information to the wider public administration (Aftenposten, 2013b). Again, this might indicate the potential effect of external reviews when it comes to effectuating changes within the organization.

On question whether he regards that the RSU, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice is close enough to the intelligence picture, Morten Ruud claims that the political level generally seem to be much closer on the military-side than what is usually the case on civilian side. In relation to the identified indicators, this suggests that the NPSS is not able to provide the continuous and relevant support to high-level decision-makers. Ruud envisages that the political level indeed could have been much more attendant to the NPSS than what is the case today (Ruud, 2012:7, 10). According to the July 22 Commission, the main challenges are related to attitudes, culture and leadership – shortcomings for which the MoJ should take its share of responsibility (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:456).

Summary

In general, the material paints a picture of insufficient connection between the NPSS and the ministerial level. Even though measures were taken to strengthen connections during the early 2000s, the dialogue between the MoJ and the NPSS still seems to deficit from the necessary strategic perspective and direction. Sources within the MoJ suggest that the ministry, after the criticisms of the Lund Commission, developed an inclination to take more distance from the service. Sources within both the NPSS and the MoJ also indicate that the ministry deficits from the required competence and understanding for capitalizing on the potential of intelligence to support its objectives. More fundamentally, it may seem that Norway lacks the culture and tradition for utilizing intelligence in decision making within the wider government and public administration. While certain sources indicate that various decision-makers increasingly show interest toward the products of the service, it seems that many public actors do not have the necessary knowledge to make use of the products. To some extent, this might be related to the general nature of the products provided by the

service. However, sources indicate that the NPSS has recently become focused on producing more specific assessments. This might in turn make it easier for customers to operationalize and utilize these assessments in their work. Still, considerable progress remains for the communication and dialogue to meet the standards which is required between intelligence services and political decision-makers in today's complex environment.

Potential drivers for change

From the material of this section it is difficult to derive specific drivers for increased connection and communication between intelligence and its customers. There sources clearly convey a need to increase the level of communication, especially with regard to questions of a more strategic nature. External reviews might be a potential driver for such an effort. In this relation, the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission have made their clear recommendations. At this point, it remains to be seen what might arise from these external correctives and suggestions. The latest developments in September 2013 might suggest that these reports have triggered certain changes within the organization, notably with the distribution of reports within the wider government. During the early 2000s, recommendations from the Danielsen Committee resulted in structural amendments to the relationship between the service and the ministry. Although these changes have not seemed to noticeably improve the communication, the effect of such changes should not be underestimated. Depending on the substance of new potential new structural amendments, such measures might represent a potential driver to increase the level of communication as well as the general appreciation of intelligence and its potential to support decision making.

Potential barriers for change

The potential barriers that can be derived from this section are not so much issues that exclusively concern the NPSS. Rather, knowledgeable sources indicate that Norway in general deficits from a strategic culture where intelligence agencies report to the top. The understanding of threats is therefore limited at the higher levels. This issue also manifests itself in a limited ability of politicians to actually define their preferences

and needs in a way that allows the NPSS to follow up in a relevant manner. The main challenges are related to attitudes, culture and leadership. Leadership begins at the top, and external reviews emphasize that the ministry undeniably should take its share of responsibility for these shortcomings. Especially noteworthy is also the statements emphasizing that the ministry, after the Lund Commission report, generally took more distance from the service. This indicates the existence of a potential adverse culture within the ministry which undoubtedly might represent a barrier for strengthening the dialogue with the NPSS. From the material it also appears that several decision-makers often find the process of obtaining access to intelligence to be overly complicated and time-consuming. In addition, certain sources explain that a strained budget situation might have contributed to limit the ministry's engagement with the service.

4.5.Cooperative

Intelligence organizations need to be properly organized for cooperation and coordination with other intelligence organizations, as well as with other relevant actors of government.

Indicators:

- *Legal provisions and instructions for cooperation*
- *Joint units*
- *Joint products*
- *Arrangements for cooperation with other relevant actors*

Early awareness and efforts at cooperation

Back in 1989, an external review by the Karlstad Committee stated that, in spite of improved relationship between the military and police intelligence services since the beginning of the 1970s, the need for better communication was persistent and substantial. However, these insights did not lead to any noteworthy improvement in the organization for cooperation between the services. The topic was later treated by the Danielsen Committee, concluding that it was essential to establish a close and trusted relationship between the agencies (Sårbarhetsutvalget, 2000:254, 257). After the events of 9/11, the US commission found major room for improvement in the framework for cooperation and coordination between the US intelligence agencies. The underlying reasoning was that, due to the dynamic and transnational nature of

threats, the institutional firewalls which traditionally erected between external and internal services now had to be broken down. Over the last decade, these wisdoms have been incorporated in the security framework of many western countries (Kynø, 2007:53). In Norway, this has spawned several initiatives aimed at improving national security cooperation, several of them focusing especially on the cooperation between the NPSS and NIS specifically (Kynø, 2007:53).

To ensure the cooperation between the intelligence services, the government established the Coordinating and Advisory Committee for the Intelligence, Surveillance and Security Services (KRU), operating after own Instruction adopted in 2002 (Aftenposten, 2010). The KRU is a joint, collaborative body for the intelligence and security services that maintains responsibility for the overall coordination of the tasks, priorities and objectives of the Norwegian intelligence services. Since Norway had no unified priority document for the coordination between the services, the KRU was the body intended to monitor and ensure such coordination (Kynø, 2007:47-48). In addition, the KRU analyzes and examines topics associated with current threats and changes in the threat environment in order to capture new challenges and implement countermeasures. The body has a permanent secretariat and comprises representatives from the MoD, MoJ, and MoFA, as well as the chiefs of NIS, NPSS and NSA (EOS-utvalget, n.d. a; Justis- og politidepartementet, 2006:47-48). Administratively, the KRU is subordinated the MoD and it reports there for matters concerning military affairs but to the MoJ in matters regarding the civil sector (Brox, 2004: 20-21). According to interviews conducted by Stein Fredrik Kynø in 2007, representatives from the MoFA and MoJ and the intelligence services found that the KRU was a well-working support element (Kynø, 2007:47). In perspective of the indicators, the KRU represents one example of new entities established for the purpose of coordination and cooperation.

New instructions and joint units

In an effort toward a general modernization of the NPSS, the Norwegian government in 2005 issued new instructions for the service. These instructions are generally

regarded as important tools that provide a framework for the NPSS to perform its tasks (Justis- og politidepartementet, 2005). The 2005 instructions also issued some advices on how to collaborate with national and international partners, more specifically stating that the NPSS shall cooperate with the Police Directorate, the NIS and the NSA. However, the instructions gave no further details of what such cooperation should entail (Instruks for Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2005). It was therefore highly relevant when the government in October 2006 adopted a separate instruction for the cooperation between the NPSS and the NIS, also including the NSA. This instruction established the preliminaries for a more formal partnership between the services for the analysis of threats (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2007). The statutory regulation specifically states that;

(...) the services shall keep each other informed of developments in relevant technology and share other relevant information, in addition to coordinating the cooperation with foreign services, establishing linkage, considering exchange of personnel, and assisting each other in threat assessments and specific cases when the respective legal frameworks allows for it (Instruks om samarbeidet mellom Etterretningstjenesten og Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste, 2006, own translation).

The aim of the instruction was to ensure that services, through their collective resources, could effectively capture and meet the potential threats and security challenges. In addition, the instruction clarifies responsibilities between the services, prioritized areas of collaboration, and recommendations for flow of information between the two (EOS-utvalget, n.d. a). According to leaders of the services, these instructions pointed the cooperation between the NPSS and the NIS in a positive direction (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394). In relation to the indicators, this provides evidence of instructions which issue guidelines for the nature and substance of the cooperation between the services.

With reference to the indicator of specific joint units which have been established to strengthen the cooperation, the government in 2008 initiated a Unit for Common Analysis (FAE) between the services. Although initially regarded as a three year pilot project, the FAE represented the first formal platform for cooperation on joint products

such as threat assessments and thematic reports. In the period 2008 to 2010, the unit developed several strategic analysis of radical Islamism, but since then, the strategic perspective has faded and the cooperation within the FAE has revolved more around operational analyses. According to the July 22 Commission, representatives of the agencies have also indicated that the FAE-initiative never materialized as a “permanent feature” (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394). The project was evaluated in 2010 and found to be mostly successful by both services. The Traavik Commission however, noted that the unit never seemed to find its form (Traavikutvalget, 2012:32-33). Although sources indicate that personnel at ground level seemed to work better together, this was not the case higher up in the hierarchies. In his Master’s thesis in 2011, Ketil Wilhelmsen still found an inadequate level of interaction between the services (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46; Wilhelmsen, 2011:71).

Cultural differences and disagreements which hinder cooperation

In an interview with the July 22 Commission, Janne Kristiansen explained that the planned evaluation of FAE was postponed several times due to disagreements between the MoD and MoJ. She claims that the MoD had not realized the major changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, and that the Ministry therefore claimed billions in order fight outdated threats while disregarding new issues such as extremism and terrorism. In the meetings of the KRU, both services often expressed a need to change the FAE, but their views did not converge on the substance of such change. Although the relationship with the NIS in general was very good, Kristiansen argues that there were significant barriers to information sharing between the services (Kristiansen, 2012:4-5; Stortinget, 2012).

Torgeir Hagen, who led the NIS in the period 2002-2009, found the cooperation to be a very sensitive issue with many gray areas which required extensive discussions. Meanwhile, Deputy Director General of the NPSS, Roger Berg, highlights that all intelligence services are reluctant to share. Berg argues that this is imprinted in the spinal cord of the employees (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:46). In 2009, Kristiansen had several meetings with the newly appointed Chief of the NIS, Kjell Grandhagen,

where these issues were discussed and common efforts were made in order to identify and address the barriers for cooperation. Kristiansen found the legal aspects as the biggest obstacle, but she also claims there are questions related to culture and attitudes (Kristiansen, 2012:4-5; Stortinget, 2012). The July 22 Commission notes that the different historical experiences and different regulations may indeed have contributed that the services have developed significantly different cultures (22. Juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). Arrangements such as the FAE were according to Kristiansen commonly dominated by different conceptions and practices, especially when it comes to sharing information. The NPSS found that they gave a lot but generally were offered little in return, thereby causing dissatisfaction within the service (Kristiansen, 2012:4-5).

Competition hinders cooperation

According to Morten Ruud at the MoJ, there seems to be, and probably always will be, a certain element of competition between the two services. Ruud does not elaborate this statement any further, but notes that competition should not necessarily be regarded a bad thing (Ruud, 2012:8). A competitive relationship might indeed be a driver for the quality of each of the services regarded separately, but when it comes to cooperation between them, it might have adverse implications. Investigative reporter and author, Kjetil Stormark, has little doubt that the relationship between the services is one dominated by competition. Although relations lately have improved, Stormark claims that the association between the NIS and the NPSS has never been particularly warm. Notably, Stormark argues that the competition between them has fostered a reluctance to share information, thus making it difficult to achieve a sound cooperative relationship (Stormark, 2013). Researcher Helge Lurås, having background from the NIS himself, elaborates this in the following terms:

Here you found people who dedicated their entire career to study the internal affairs of one or another country. They rarely met a decision-maker, and the public could never get insight into what they knew and what they were doing. It was therefore competition for recognition in the first place. If they in addition met a dork from another service who worked on the exact same issues, a competitive relationship naturally arose (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:45).

Lasse Roen argues that we must dare to talk about the competition between the services, because the competition clearly exists. Roen warns that the relationship must not become a fight for attention in a way that allows the ego of individuals to stand in the way of national security (Roen, 2012:49). Former Minister of Justice Odd Einar Dørum, says that everybody who has studied sociology understands that questions of competition is raised. However, Dørum claims that he followed the services closely and never received information of sloppy cooperation between the two (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:45). Jørn Holme provides a similar account to this question, emphasizing that the flow of information was good and that he never experienced any barrier or obstructions of a competitive kind between the two organizations (Stortinget, 2012).

Although the previous and current leaders of the NPSS and the NIS seem to diverge slightly with regard of how the cooperation has functioned, their overall assessment generally lands on the positive side, highlighting major improvements in the relationship between the two services. Kjell Grandhagen states that the cooperation is better than ever before, but notes that the threat scenario in Norway has changed significantly over the recent years, meaning that there is continued potential for improving the relations between the NIS and the NPSS (Stortinget, 2012). It might indeed be relevant to discuss whether these are true reflections of the cooperation or merely a public charade of the leaders in order to silent the critical voices. As one internal source stated to Norwegian Newspaper *Dagens Næringsliv* in December 2012:

Publicly we are one big happy family, but this does not match with reality (Brunmark & Solberg, 2012:41).

The numerous attempts for actually strengthening the arrangements might also indicate that the cooperation has in fact not been as seamless as the public statements of the leaders seem to portray. This is not to say that cooperation has moved in a positive direction since 2001, but the external reports and assessments in the wake of 22/7 have highlighted a persistent and considerable room for improvement in the framework and practice for cooperation between the two organizations. In addition, it seems that the

leaders of the services generally portray a more nuanced picture of the cooperation in the classified documents, than what is the case in the open forum. Among others, this is evident in the statements and interviews given to the July 22 Commission.

The impact of 22/7

In 2010, the two services agreed on an action plan to further describe and develop their cooperation, herein considering possibilities of joint information gathering as well as circulation of expertise, knowledge and information. Considering that the services function on different legal bases, the NPSS in 2011 directed an inquiry to the MoJ in order to clarify legal interpretations for the sharing of information (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394). Among others, the service highlighted the lack of legal foundations for redistributing information which gathered through coercive measures - an issue which according to the Traavik commission has significantly curbed the cooperation between the two services (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38). FAE was evaluated by the organizations in February 2011, and it was suggested to permanently establish the unit, but not on a fulltime-functioning basis (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:394). However, the terrorist attacks later same year gave new impetus and direction to this effort. In its 2012-report, the July 22 Commission suggested that the services, in their effort to strengthen the cooperation, should not feel restricted to the by the FAE-model. It was argued that a more institutionalized cooperation was required, possibly including rotation in personnel to ensure continuous enhancement of competence at both organizations. In addition, the commission advised the services to consider whether personnel from other parts of government also should be included, in order to strengthen cooperation across sectors (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 394-395). Later, the Traavik Commission recommended the establishment of a permanent unit with responsibility of developing joint products and assessments. It was suggested that the unit should include staff from the NPSS, the NIS and the NSA, while other relevant actors should be linked to the unit through a consultation mechanism (Traavikutvalget, 2012:7).

Accordingly, the services in February 2013 announced intentions to establish a new Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (JCTC), situated at the NPSS headquarters in Oslo. The announcement came whilst the services presented their first Joint Public Threat Assessment, which prepared cooperatively of the NPSS, the NIS and the NSA. The annual joint assessment is planned to be one main products of the JCTC. The establishment of the JCTC therefore carries considerable relevance to the indicators of development, representing not only a joint unit for cooperation, but furthermore a framework for the continuous development of joint products within the intelligence community. A startup date for the JCTC is not yet determined, but the government believes that the center will be up and running within 2013 (Aftenposten, 2013; NRK, 2013). Again, this also illustrates that reviews of external commissions might have significant influence on the developments within the organization. In this case, the organizational change can nearly be seen as a direct consequence of the recommendations of the external reviews. Also interesting is the fact that neighboring countries and close allies, such as Sweden and Denmark, established permanent units which very similar to the JCTC a while ago. Although these units have faced some of the similar legal challenges as the Norwegian FAE, the overall assessment both in Sweden and Denmark is that the establishment has been successful and rewarding. Specifically, these joint units have improved the quality of analyses and contributed to break down the walls between the participating agencies (Traavikutvalget, 2012:33). This might suggest that good practices of close allies represent a model or standard for the Norwegian service to work toward, and that the successful changes in other countries might represent one potential driver for further development within the NPSS.

It is currently unclear what specific mandate the JCTC will have, and how many employees the center will hold. According to Grete Faremo, it can initially be expected to hold a small number of staff, with an aim of a gradual expansion. Upon the announcement, Faremo would not mention any specific experiences that had led to the establishment of the JCTC, but stated that there had been a desire for more joint analyzes of the NIS and the NPSS. The objective was therefore to establish a stronger

formal structure for the cooperation, where personnel - rotating in from both services - will be situated under the same roof in order to develop a more genuine joint product. In addition, the center is planned to work closely with other relevant government actors (Aftenposten, 2013; NRK, 2013).

It remains to be seen what arises from this effort. Critical observers such as Kjetil Stormark show limited optimism. Behind the clever name, Stormark currently finds little content and limited specific commitment. In his view, the JCTC so far appears to be nothing much but a new label for the FAE, which according to Stormark was dominated by competition and a reluctance to share information. He highlights that the outcome of the initiative needs to be founded on more than a neat name adjustment; it will require sound political leadership, clearer responsibilities and considerably more resources than before (Stormark, 2013).

The Traavik Commission acknowledges that the relationship between the services historically has been difficult and that there still is considerable room for improvement. On this note, the commission argue that a more institutionalized cooperation on analyzes, such as the JCTC, might serve to strengthen not only the analytical products, but also the ties and associations between the two organizations (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5).

Cooperation outside the intelligence community

In an article in Aftenposten, Lasse Roen and Arvid Ellingsen also acknowledge that the JCTC might represent a step in the right direction. However, the authors argue that the center might be too narrowly composed to provide the broad support and coordination which is required in today's security environment. Scenarios such as pandemic, natural disasters and organized crime represent only a few of the unconventional threats that the Norwegian government should prepare for, and these are risks that might affect and interfere with the entire public administration. In this relation, Roen and Ellingsen argue for the need of more cooperation outside the intelligence environment, through sharing of knowledge and expertise. Among other

things, the authors argue that research might provide improved methods to assess the threats and how they can be avoided. Research communities are standing ready waiting, but lack the commissioning and financing. As an example, Roen and Ellingsen portray that research can present reliable knowledge about the links between extremism and violent actions, and more fundamentally, how such attitudes can be prevented (Aftenposten, 2013a).

Both in Norway and internationally, there has been a growing tradition for sharing information between intelligence agencies. However, due to the significant demands of confidentiality, sharing of information with actors outside the intelligence organizations “secret circle of trust” is more rarely seen. In this relation, the 2012 report of the Traavik Commission states that:

In the Commission’s view, the NPSS’ cooperation and interaction with other actors of the society has generally improved over the recent years. However, it still can and should be strengthened. In conversations with actors whom the NPSS cooperate with it appears that they consider the service little willing to share information, and that this may create unnecessary obstacles for the cooperation (Traavikutvalget, 2012:5).

Similar insights are found in the July 22 Commission’s report, where it is emphasized that the service in some cases is so uncommunicative that it hinders other actors from contributing with their expertise and information for resolving the challenges of the service. On the other hand, personnel within the NPSS have expressed that they find it difficult to work with other actors, as much of the information is strictly classified (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012: 386-387).

The July 22 Commission regards cross-sectorial information sharing as critical for the government’s ability to deal with today’s threats. More specifically, it is essential that other government agencies have knowledge of the NPSS’ information needs so that they can develop sensitivity to identify and disseminate information that is important for the service. The Norwegian Contact Group for the Prevention of Terrorism, which established in 2005, represents one effort intended to promote dialogue and cooperation on security threats and measures. This group was led by the NPSS, with

partakers from several central actors of the society including senior managers of 25 government agencies and five industry organizations (Aftenposten, 2013b; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:387). However, the Contact Group never seemed to find its form and was practically dissolved in 2009. The Traavik Commission argues that structures like this might be an important contribution in order to clarify the different social roles and responsibilities of the various governmental actors (Traavikutvalget, 2012:37). Following 2011 and the shock of 22/7, this group have again met regularly (22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:387).

In interview with the commission, Janne Kristiansen highlights that she earlier had considered an expansion of the FAE, possibly including the MoFA and other relevant actors. However, Kristiansen found this difficult since this was not desired of the other members of the FAE. She emphasize that the other members, such as the NIS, were concerned with the MoFA's working methods with reference to classified information – a matter which, according to Kristiansen, did not distress the NPSS particularly (Kristiansen, 2012:13).

The analysis finds little support to the indicator of cooperation with other relevant actors, a circumstance which seems closely related to the sensitivity and secrecy which naturally follows intelligence. While the secrecy of intelligence undoubtedly poses significant barriers for information sharing and dialogue with other actors, many governmental agencies are themselves also subject to extensive confidentiality provisions, meaning that the information they can provide the service is limited by law. Both commission-reports and the NPSS itself underlines that the confidentiality provisions raise barriers for the dialogue and information exchange with other key players of society (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38-39; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:387-388). In order to assess whether it has the right to give up information, public actors often require details to why the information is requested. However, usually the NPSS does not have authority to provide such information, due to strict confidentiality or because it could harm the prevention or investigation (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:49).

The NPSS therefore emphasizes that the current regulations add major obstacles to dialogue between service and other public authorities (PST, 2012a:3).

Both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission recommend a thorough review of these provisions in order to eliminate unnecessary barriers to cooperation and information exchange (Traavikutvalget, 2012:38-39; 22. juli-kommisjonen, 2012:387-388). Currently, these matters are under review by the MoJ in cooperation with other relevant ministries (St. meld. nr. 21, 2012-2013:49).

Summary

The material reflects an early awareness for the need of strengthening cooperation between the services, but developments until 2006 were patchy and provided limited details and formal arrangements around the substance of the cooperation. Leaders of the services indicate that the cooperation since 2006 has moved in a positive direction, notably, with the instruction for cooperation which established the preliminaries of a more formal partnership between the services. The FAE-initiative in 2008 resulted in the services developing several joint analyses, but the initiative did not seem to find its form, and accordingly, the FAE never materialized as a permanent feature. While sources indicate that personnel at ground level in later years have worked better together, this does not seem to be the case higher up in the hierarchies. The cooperation has stranded on obstacles related to legal matters, different cultures and diverging conceptions within the services. While the cooperation undoubtedly has moved in positive direction since 2001, external sources and reports still highlights a persistent and considerable room for improvement in the framework and practice for cooperation between the two organizations. In general, leaders of the services publicly convey a picture of significant developments in the relationship, while personnel on the ground level and external sources in this respect seem to be more critical. The aftermath of 22/7 gave new drive to the efforts toward cooperation, and based on the recommendations of external commissions, the services in February 2013 announced intentions to establish the JCTC, which among others will provide an annual joint assessment. Although certain observers are more critical, this study will argue that the

JCTC, depending on its mandate and focus, might represent a considerable step in right direction. This institutional setting might serve to strengthen the joint analyses while also contributing to break down the historically difficult relationship between the services. Depending on the composition of the JCTC, it might also serve to improve the cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence environment. The material emphasize that, due to the significant demands of confidentiality, sharing of information with actors outside the intelligence environment has so far generally been a troublesome matter.

Potential drivers for change

The analysis reveals that the evolvments in the threat environment, with emergence of new, complex and transnational threats, have been a key drivers for cooperation between the Norwegian intelligence services. After the 9/11-attacks, the US-commission emphasized these issues and highlighted the need to take effective measures to secure cooperation. This indicates that crises such as 9/11 and external reviews and recommendations are important drivers toward change. This is also supported in the Norwegian case, where the analysis reveals considerable progress in the aftermath of the attacks of 22/7. In similar to the case of 9/11, recommendations of the external commissions seem to have contributed significantly in this effort. Notably, the suggestions of both the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission are largely reflected in the planned establishment of the JCTC, indicating that external input has been an important catalyst for development. In addition, several sources indicate that evaluations of arrangements and practices in neighboring countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, might have provided guidelines and direction for this effort.

Potential barriers for change

The analysis has found several potential barriers for developing the required level of cooperation within and outside the intelligence community. According to the material the most central issues are related to different cultures and conceptions within the various services, the competition between them, and ambiguities in the legal framework for sharing of information. Both external and internal sources indicate that

the services have developed significantly different cultures and that their conceptions of threats and how to best manage them does not always converge. These issues seem especially pertinent at the level of management and at the ministerial level. More specifically, it appears that the services have developed different conceptions of information sharing, and that the flow between them is therefore not optimal. In this relation, several sources emphasize that there might have developed a competitive relationship which hinders cooperation between the services. To some extent, this might follow from the fact that the services are highly specialized and isolated organizations. Furthermore, considering that the services function on different legal bases, the analysis finds indications of legal ambiguities, which to some extent might have curbed the cooperation.

Concerning the cooperation with actors outside the intelligence environment, sources within the NPSS have emphasized that they find such cooperation difficult as much of the information they manage is strictly classified. This is largely confirmed by external sources that generally perceive the service to be little communicative. Similarly, confidentiality provisions within the wider public administration means that the information other actors can provide the service is often limited by law. It thus appears that confidentiality related issues remain one central barrier for an appropriate dialogue between the NPSS and actors outside the intelligence environment.

Chapter V: Conclusions

The end of the Cold War and the period following the attacks of 9/11 carried significant implications for western intelligence. Major developments such as globalization have spawned an increasingly complex security environment, while new perspectives on security imply that the role and requirements for intelligence organizations have been vastly expanded. This case study set out to assess how the Norwegian Police Security Service has responded to the changes in the security environment under this period, and to explore possible explanations for change or continuity within the organization. Based on insights within the academic field of intelligence, the study identified 5 specific requirements for the organization of modern intelligence services; multidisciplinary, proactive, open and transparent, accessible, and cooperative.

5.1.Developments

In general the analysis indicates a high level of awareness both within and outside the NPSS for the need to adapt according to the identified requirements. In terms of developments, it is found that the organization has made significant and relevant progress in some areas, while other parts will require continued and considerable efforts in order to meet the identified requirements. The most noteworthy developments are seen in the efforts for achieving the required level of multidisciplinary expertise and the appropriate amount of openness and transparency. From being exclusively a police organization, the NPSS has over the last decade moved significantly toward becoming a fundamentally multidisciplinary “knowledge organization”. Although a continued effort is required for developing the necessary level of broad competence, the analysis demonstrates that recruitment today takes a far more active and broader formula, resulting that the service nearly doubled its number of educated specialists in the period 2002-2011. Therefore, this study would argue that this is one area where the service has advanced much during the period under study. Although the analysis underlines that intelligence and openness is a relationship riddled with contradictions and difficult considerations, this is also one of the areas

where the study finds that most significant progress has been made. Over the last decade, the service has shown an increased and considerable will to be more open about its assessments, activities, and general contribution toward safeguarding vital national interests. Noteworthy developments in this relation include the release of public threat assessments, the presence in social media, and a growing number of public appearances from leaders and representatives of the service.

In relation to the remaining three requirements, the analysis has found that developments have been unsatisfactory. Although the analysis revealed an internal awareness of the need to be more proactive and focus on strategic trends and root causes of threats, both internal and external sources indicate that the service has not managed to adapt sufficiently in relation to this requirement. More specifically, the findings demonstrate that scarce leadership, unbalanced priorities and unproductive cultures has resulted that the NPSS has not been able to devote enough attention to the strategic picture and potential new and emerging threats. Certain legal ambiguities needs to be clarified, and in certain areas, authorities might need to be expanded, but generally it seems that the service has not managed to seize upon the potential of its existing regulatory framework to achieve the proactive formula required in today's threat environment.

The study has also found that the services and the political level have not managed to achieve the close and communicative dialogue which is needed to secure the right priorities of the service and the relevant support to decision-makers. The dialogue between the NPSS and the MoJ largely deficits from strategic perspective and direction, and the connection with other actors within the wider government is found to be marginal. More fundamentally, the analysis indicates that Norway lacks the strategic culture and tradition for utilizing intelligence for decision making within the wider government and public administration.

With regard to the NPSS' ability to cooperate with actors within and outside the intelligence community, the analysis has found that the association with the NIS has

developed under slow momentum. Over the last decade, several initiatives reflect an understanding of the need to strengthen the cooperation between the services. Leaders of both the NPSS and the NIS indicate that the cooperation since 2006 has moved in a positive direction, notably, with the instruction for cooperation in 2006 and the FAE-initiative in 2008. Still, internal sources and external reviews have highlighted that enduring issues related to culture, competition and different conceptions have resulted in these initiatives not materializing in any extensive cooperation. Furthermore, due to the extensive secrecy of intelligence and confidentiality provisions within the wider public administration, cooperation with other actors outside the intelligence community is today insufficient.

This study argues that the planned establishment of the JCTC, depending on composition, mandate and focus, might be a considerable step in right direction. This institutional framework might not only contribute to strengthen joint analyses and break down some of the walls within the intelligence community, but might also serve to improve the cooperation with other relevant actors outside the intelligence organizations circle of thrust.

5.2. Identified drivers and barriers

The study has revealed a number of potential drivers and barriers for change within the NPSS. Several of these mechanisms appear to be both interrelated and self-reinforcing.

With regard to potential drivers, three recurring mechanisms seem to be especially relevant for explaining change within the organization. Firstly, the analysis indicates that the security environment, and more specifically the changes in the threat scenario, is one central driver for change within the organization. In this relation it is furthermore identified that shocks or crises, such as 9/11 or 22/7 might provide further thrust and urgency to the efforts, resulting that determined measures are taken. Secondly and partly related to the previous driver, the analysis asserts that external correctives from commissions or other advisory bodies may be highly influential for

the direction and development of the organization. Strong indications are found for this in the implementation of the recommendations of the Danielsen Committee as well as in the follow up of the reports from the July 22 Commission and the Traavik Commission. This mechanism can also be seen in the influence of the media which constantly challenges the organization to change, especially relevant for the case of increased openness and transparency. Thirdly, leadership and determined efforts from the top of the organization are recurring factors in those instances where considerable change has succeeded. Considering that the NPSS, compared to other public actors, is a closed organization, sound and rational leadership from the top seems to be one highly important factor in order to effectuate substantial changes. In addition the analysis also indicates that organizational structure, amendments in the legal framework, and the examples set of other countries are factors which potentially might drive and provide further inclination toward change within the organization.

The analysis has found several potential barriers for change within the NPSS. The most central seem to be related to the fact that the NPSS is a restricted organization with high demands for confidentiality. This implies that the NPSS, in contrast to other public organizations, is not subject to the same correctives and continuous evaluation from the society and therefore, the organization develops largely under its own momentum. This carries several adverse implications. Firstly, the analysis indicates that the culture within the service in general has become too bound to traditions or path dependent, meaning that the decisions made in the past to a great extent influences current decisions, even though past circumstances are no longer relevant. Although this might create stability in the organization, it also significantly reduces the ability to adapt quickly in accordance with the environment, an outcome which clearly is evident in the analysis. Secondly, managing change within such closed organizations presumes strong leadership. In this relation, the analysis finds that the NPSS is lacking the required strategic leadership to define the direction and focus of the organization. This accounts largely for leadership at various levels within the organization, but it is also reflected in the dialogue with the MoJ, which is the NPSS' main external sparring partner. When leaders are not able to clearly point out the

strategic direction of the service this can, among other, result in the emergence of potentially unhealthy subcultures where the narrow interests of single individuals or departments are given preference to define the focus and pathway of the organization. In case of the NPSS, this seem to have resulted that too little attention is offered to the overarching goals and objectives which are relevant in relation to the security environment the NPSS operates within. Thirdly, the high demands for confidentiality within the organization results that the NPSS often either is unable or unwilling to share information with others. Clearly, there are certain limits to how open and transparent the organization can be toward the society. However, the analysis also indicates that this presents significant barriers for the cooperation with other actors both within and outside the intelligence community. In the relationship with the NIS, different cultures and competition between the services might also have contributed that the communication between them is insufficient.

In addition to these more overarching issues, the analysis also indicates that there are possible challenges for development embedded in the legal framework and in the strong monitoring from the EOS Committee. It is common knowledge that the development of society often will lie ahead of the laws governing it. In this relation it seems that regulatory issues to some extent might have hindered the sufficient developments, especially in areas such as the Internet.

5.3.Suggestions for further research

Finally, this exploratory study was meant to be exactly that – exploratory. Therefore it is appropriate to highlight some interesting topics and issues for future research.

The study has identified several potential drivers and barriers for change within the NPSS, and undoubtedly this is a highly interesting topic for further study. Considering the many intelligence organizations carry some of the same inherent characteristics with regard to secrecy, lack of external correctives and high degree of specialization, a more comprehensive study of these key mechanisms might potentially achieve high

external validity and therefore have value beyond the specific case or cases under study.

Such research might in example consider how various parameters within intelligence organizations – structure, culture, decision processes – might affect the general capacity for change and development within such organization. Organizational theory suggests that such parameters might have significant effects on the organizations ability to adapt. For instance, organizational theory emphasize that organizations with formalized and function based working processes as well as centralized procedures for decision making are often less adaptive than more dynamic and decentralized organizations (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:90-94). This is also evident in the case of this study where the function-based structure and high degree of specialization within the NPSS might have produced certain adverse sub-cultures. In this case, the culture might be described as “department egoism”, resulting that various departments are little aligned with reference to the further development of the organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:63, 69).

Another highly interesting point of departure for a study would be to utilize organizational theory and its acknowledged perspectives for explaining organizational change, such as the rational, institutional or neo-institutional perspectives. These theories provide three distinct ways of looking upon change within organizations. Within the rational perspective, change is based on the assumption of intentionality in the sense that changes are aligned towards clearly defined goals and objectives. These are defined by the management which realizes the need to change the organization. Such top-down approach, where leaders recognize a need for change and take action accordingly, is indicated in several of the efforts within the NPSS. The analysis indicates that rational and determined efforts of leadership can be regarded one of the central drivers for change within the NPSS. The institutional perspective on the other hand, is often described as a counterpart to the rational perspective. Through this perspective, changes are usually considered a natural development process in which the organization gradually adapts to its internal and external environment. Here,

changes can be interpreted as time-consuming processes in which culture is one central focus for the process of change. From the analysis of this study it appears clear that cultures within the NPSS means that the organization in some areas is resistant to demands for rapid and comprehensive changes. Several sections of the analysis highlight internal resistance toward the efforts of change, which through the institutional perspective would be described as an integral inertia of the organization. Meanwhile, the neo-institutional perspective targets the relationship between the organization and its environment. The key question is how the organization is affected and influenced by pressure and therefore effectuates changes that are accepted in the surroundings. The expectations from the environment imply that the organization must adhere to norms of organizational design, and attempt to incorporate and reflect these norms outwards, even though they do not necessarily make the organization more efficient. From the analysis of this study, it is found that the change toward more openness and transparency clearly can be considered a result of new demands, values and norms in the environment (Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007:156-161).

Intuitively, one can see that all of these perspectives might have exploratory power for the case of this study. This indicates that a more systematic study by means of these theories might yield valuable insights for how to understand and explain organizational change or continuity within intelligence organizations. A more thorough examination like this would however likely require a more extensive source material than what could be acquired for this study, for example through in-depth interviews. In addition, such examinations might benefit from including a comparative element - to other countries or model examples. This researcher finds that a study of the Norwegian case compared to the approaches in Sweden, Denmark or the UK could potentially yield valuable findings.

Whichever topic catches attention of other researchers, this exploratory research has clearly underlined that the demands for change in relation to intelligence organizations are significant. The post-Cold War era carried new threats and challenges, new technology, and new demands from the society, meaning that intelligence

organizations continuously need to develop its capacity to adapt accordingly. In this relation, this study as well as potential future research on the topic might provide critical insights for the organizations ability to manage change and navigate an increasingly turbulent landscape.

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